Law Commons^™

Department Of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before The S. Comm. On The Judiciary, 107th Cong., Dec. 6, 2001 (Statement Of Neal Kumar Katyal, Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), Neal K. Katyal

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

A Truism That Isn't True? The Tenth Amendment And Executive War Power, D. A. Jeremy Telman

Law Faculty Publications

The Tenth Amendment is invoked whenever congressional powers threaten the independent law-making power of the several states. In that context, however, the Tenth Amendment does not tell us very much. After all, if powers are not delegated to the federal government, where else would they go but to the states? Accordingly, the Supreme Court has dismissed the Amendment as a truism.

Although the Amendment is only deployed as a rather ineffectual check on congressional authority, it clearly applies to all branches of the federal government. However, according to the theory of inherent executive authority, certain powers are unique to the …

Judicial Nomination And Confirmation Process: Hearing Before The S. Comm. On The Judiciary, 107th Cong., Sept. 4, 2001 (Statement Of Mark V. Tushnet, Prof. Of Law, Geo. U. L. Center), Mark V. Tushnet

Testimony Before Congress

No abstract provided.

Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation Of Judicial Decision-Making, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Modern federal courts scholars have been fascinated by the question of Congress' power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts.' This fascination is not difficult to explain: the question is theoretically profound and raises fundamental issues about the roles of Congress and the federal courts in the constitutional order.2 As a practical matter, however, the question has proven to be of limited significance. Despite a recent spate of legislation restricting access to courts by prisoners and immigrants,3 people talk about wholesale jurisdiction-stripping far more than they actually do it.

The Neglected History Of The Prior Restraint Doctrine: Rediscovering The Link Between The First Amendment And The Separation Of Powers, Michael I. Meyerson

All Faculty Scholarship

The prior restraint doctrine, once so fundamental to Constitutional Jurisprudence, has lost much of its effectiveness over the years. Nevertheless, prior restraint doctrine is crucial to preserving the line between protected and unprotected speech. One of the fundamental problems that contribute to the current ineffectiveness of prior restraint doctrine is that there exists no comprehensive definition of "prior restraint". This article chronicles the historical roots of prior restraint in order to arrive at a generally accepted legal definition. Through the course of this historical journey, the article yields a heretofore unexplored aspect of prior restraint doctrine, namely that prior restraint …

Dissing Congress , Ruth Colker, James J. Brudney

Faculty Scholarship

This article adopts a novel separation of powers framework to analyze the Rehnquist Court's recent decisions under the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. We demonstrate in historical terms how the Court's methods for assessing the constitutional adequacy of federal laws have changed dramatically since the mid-1990s, and we argue that these new methods are undermining the proper role of Congress and producing a significant shift in the balance of power between the Branches. We identify two distinct methodologies employed by the Rehnquist Court that have resulted in growing disrespect for Congress - the "crystal ball" and …

Printz, The Unitary Executive, And The Fire In The Trash Can: Has Justice Scalia Picked The Court's Pocket?, Jay S. Bybee

Scholarly Works

In Printz v. United States (1997), the Court held that certain sections of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act were unconstitutional. Until the Attorney General set up a national system, the Act required the chief local law enforcement official to make certain background checks. The Court held that Congress exceeded its authority by requiring local law enforcement officials to take this action. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia “conclude[d] categorically . . . ‘The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.” ’ The Court offered two justifications. First, these commands to the …

The Marbury Mystery: Why Did William Marbury Sue In The Supreme Court?, Susan Low Bloch

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In 1801, when William Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Secretary of State James Madison to deliver his commission as justice of the peace, he initiated one of the most important cases in the Court's history. But why did Marbury choose the Supreme Court? Was there a lower federal court that could have granted the writ at the time? The short answer is "yes." Rather than making an unsuccessful attempt to invoke the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, I have learned that he could have brought his suit in the then …

Subconstitutional Constitutional Law: Supplement, Sham, Or Substitute?, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this brief Comment I make two points. First, the subconstitutional doctrines appear to have the advantage of allowing elected lawmakers to pursue whatever course they wish, as long as they satisfy the requirements of these subconstitutional doctrines. In practice, however, what appears to be a provisional invalidation based on subconstitutional law turns out to be - and, indeed, might be expected at the moment of decision to be - a final, unrevisable decision. Further, courts might strategically deploy these sub constitutional doctrines to avoid the sting of the charge that they are foreclosing legislative choice while effectively doing so. …

Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, Neal K. Katyal

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This is an Essay about "the how" of constitutional interpretation. Much attention has been devoted to the question of how the Constitution is interpreted in courts. Rather little attention has been devoted to the question of how the Constitution is interpreted elsewhere in the government. The Constitution tells us that Congress, the President, and state legislators and courts must adhere to its terms, but it does not tell us how much interpretive power each actor should have, nor does it prescribe rules for each actor to use when interpreting the text. I argue that constitutional interpretation by Congress is, and …

"Shut Up He Explained", Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Part I of this Commentary examines the conversational model of politics. I argue that the virtues Bennett finds in the conversational model exist only when, and to the extent that, participants in civil and political society can engage in undominated conversation. The requirement that conversation be undominated generates a substantial set of social prerequisites, mostly dealing with equality. And yet, determining what social arrangements actually satisfy those prerequisites is itself a matter of constitutional controversy. Resolving such controversies through politics is no solution, because the political arena is where we seek to ensure that nondomination prevails in civil society, and, …

Towards A Constitutional Architecture For Cooperative Federalism, Philip J. Weiser

Publications

In this Article, Professor Weiser calls for a new conception of federal-state relations to justify existing political practice under cooperative federalism regulatory programs. In particular, Professor Weiser highlights how Congress favors cooperative federalism programs--that combine federal and state authority in creative ways--and has rejected the dual federalism model of regulation--with separate spheres of state and federal authority that current judicial rhetoric often celebrates. Given the increasing dissonance between prevailing political practice and judicial rhetoric, courts will ultimately have to confront three fault lines for current cooperative federalism programs: the legal source of authority for state agencies to implement federal law, …