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Full-Text Articles in Law
Securities Price Risks And Financial Derivative Markets, Peter H. Huang
Securities Price Risks And Financial Derivative Markets, Peter H. Huang
Publications
The financial and popular media report almost daily on the volatility of securities market prices. Yet, many people continue to buy securities to hedge against or speculate on certain risks. People can also buy or sell derivatives to hedge against or speculate on fluctuations in securities prices. This Article discusses three regulatory policy implications of utilizing derivatives markets to reallocate the bearing of securities price risks. First, if there are too few non-redundant derivative markets, a competitive market equilibrium allocation of securities price risks is typically constrained Pareto inefficient. This financial economic result means that for typical economies, a regulator …
Securities Fraud In Cyberspace: Reaching The Outer Limits Of The Federal Securities Laws, Constance Z. Wagner
Securities Fraud In Cyberspace: Reaching The Outer Limits Of The Federal Securities Laws, Constance Z. Wagner
All Faculty Scholarship
This article discusses the increasing use of the Internet for securities transactions, the growth of securitiesfraud perpetrated through that medium and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) enforcement program initiated to combat it. The author critiques the position taken by the SEC that the existing anti-fraudprovisions of the federal securities laws can be stretched to cover Internet fraud. Using an enforcement action brought by the SEC against an online stock trading guru named Tokyo Joe as an example of the confused jurisprudence that results when pre-cyberspace law is applied to securities fraud in cyberspace, the author proposes a different regulatory …
The Issuer Choice Debate, Merritt B. Fox
The Issuer Choice Debate, Merritt B. Fox
Faculty Scholarship
This article responds to Professor Romano’s piece in this issue. It concerns our ongoing debate with regard to the desirability of permitting issuers to choose the securities regulation regime by which they are bound. Romano favors issuer choice, arguing that it would result in jurisdictional competition to offer issuers share value maximizing regulations. I, in contrast, believe that abandoning the current mandatory system of federal securities disclosure would likely lower, not increase, U.S. welfare. Each issuer, I argue, would select a regime requiring a level of disclosure less than is socially optimal because its private costs of disclosure would be …