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Full-Text Articles in Law

Bringing Structure To The Law Of Injunctions Against Expression, Christina E. Wells Oct 2000

Bringing Structure To The Law Of Injunctions Against Expression, Christina E. Wells

Faculty Publications

Part I of this Article reviews the Court's cases regarding injunctions against speech, focusing first on the increasing elevation of rhetoric (as opposed to analysis) in the Court's prior restraint decisions. Part I also reviews the Court's other decisions involving injunctions and demonstrates that they too contain little, if any, analysis concerning the appropriateness of injunctive relief against expression. Part II examines Madsen's interaction with the Court's previous decisions and discusses how Madsen furthers the incoherence of the Court's previous cases. Part III explains that content discrimination principles, although superficially attractive, are inappropriate with injunctive relief because the content-based/content-neutral distinction's …


Differentiating The Free Exercise And Establishment Clauses, Carl H. Esbeck Jul 2000

Differentiating The Free Exercise And Establishment Clauses, Carl H. Esbeck

Faculty Publications

The purpose of the Establishment Clause is not to safeguard individual religious rights. That is the role of the Free Exercise Clause, indeed its singular role. The purpose of the Establishment Clause, rather, is as a structural restraint on governmental power. Because of its structural character, the task of the Establishment Clause is to limit government from legislating or otherwise acting on any matter "respecting an establishment of religion." The powers that fall within the scope of the foregoing clause (denied to government, hence within the sole province of religion) and the powers outside this clause (hence, authority vested in …


Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse In Cyberspace, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky Feb 2000

Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse In Cyberspace, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky

UF Law Faculty Publications

John Doe has become a popular defamation defendant as corporations and their officers bring defamation suits for statements made about them in Internet discussion fora. These new suits are not even arguably about recovering money damages but instead are brought for symbolic reasons-some worthy, some not so worthy. If the only consequence of these suits were that Internet users were held accountable for their speech, the suits would be an unalloyed good. However, these suits threaten to suppress legitimate criticism along with intentional and reckless falsehoods, and existing First Amendment law doctrines are not responsive to the threat these suits …


Defamation Per Se: Defamation By Mistake?, Michael K. Steenson Jan 2000

Defamation Per Se: Defamation By Mistake?, Michael K. Steenson

Faculty Scholarship

Defamation is a complicated tort, due in part to the differing rules that govern libel and slander, the two branches of the tort. The focus of this essay is on “defamation per se,” its origins in Minnesota, and the consequences of its misapplication. The essay opens with a short statement of standard defamation principles, followed by a short statement of the prevailing United States Supreme Court decisions, imposing First Amendment limitations on common law defamation claims, and the Minnesota cases that follow them. The next part analyzes a string of Minnesota cases that establish the foundation for Minnesota defamation law, …


Introduction: Tiger Woods And The First Amendment, Tyler T. Ochoa Jan 2000

Introduction: Tiger Woods And The First Amendment, Tyler T. Ochoa

Faculty Publications

Although the right of publicity has been recognized as a distinct common-law doctrine since 1953, only in recent years have courts begun to take the First Amendment seriously as a limit on the extent to which sports figures and other celebrities can use the doctrine to control the use of their images. It is widely recognized that the government may prohibit false and misleading speech, such as an advertisement that falsely implies an endorsement of a product by an individual, without violating the First Amendment. Similarly, it is generally acknowledged that the First Amendment protects the depiction of celebrities in …


The First Amendment's Petition Clause As An Alternative Basis For Challenging Voter Initiatives That Burden The Enactment Of Anti-Discrimination Protection For Gays, Lesbians, And Bisexuals, Kevin F. O'Neill Jan 2000

The First Amendment's Petition Clause As An Alternative Basis For Challenging Voter Initiatives That Burden The Enactment Of Anti-Discrimination Protection For Gays, Lesbians, And Bisexuals, Kevin F. O'Neill

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

In the battle for gay, lesbian, and bisexual rights, most of the fighting has centered on two sources of constitutional protection: substantive due process and equal protection. Unfortunately, courts have been reluctant to find in either of those constitutional guarantees a broad source of protection for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. The purpose of my remarks today is to suggest that the First Amendment—specifically, the Petition Clause of the First Amendment—provides an alternative basis for vindicating gay, lesbian, and bisexual rights in certain cases. At least in the context of voter initiatives that seek to abolish anti-discrimination protection for sexual orientation, …


Charitable Choice And The Critics, Carl H. Esbeck Jan 2000

Charitable Choice And The Critics, Carl H. Esbeck

Faculty Publications

First, the statute prohibits the government from discriminating with regard to religion when determining whether providers are eligible to deliver social services under these programs. Second, the statute imposes on government the duty not to intrude into the religious autonomy of faith-based providers. Third, the statute imposes on both government and participating FBOs the duty not to abridge certain rights of the ultimate beneficiaries of these programs. I will touch on these three principles below, and do so in reverse order.


Silencing John Doe: Defamation And Discourse In Cyberspace, Lyrissa Lidsky Jan 2000

Silencing John Doe: Defamation And Discourse In Cyberspace, Lyrissa Lidsky

Faculty Publications

John Doe has become a popular defamation defendant as corporations and their officers bring defamation suits for statements made about them in Internet discussion fora. These new suits are not even arguably about recovering money damages but instead are brought for symbolic reasons — some worthy, some not so worthy. If the only consequence of these suits were that Internet users were held accountable for their speech, the suits would be an unalloyed good. However, these suits threaten to suppress legitimate criticism along with intentional and reckless falsehoods, and existing First Amendment law doctrines are not responsive to the threat …


Classroom Lecture For Copyright Law, Wendy J. Gordon Jan 2000

Classroom Lecture For Copyright Law, Wendy J. Gordon

Scholarship Chronologically

The differences between direct, vicarious and contributory liability, Section 512 in related matters. Alright, now let's move on to the next question, which is criminal liability. You read some material on that. And the basic lessons that I want you to take from the material are the following. First, notice that federal copyright law does not impose criminal liability easily as ordinary laws of tangible property do. And I think that that's a good thing. Remember that guy in Les Miserables who's pursued for stealing a loaf of bread. Stealing in the sense of copying one song would not make …


Complexity And Copyright In Contradiction, Michael J. Madison Jan 2000

Complexity And Copyright In Contradiction, Michael J. Madison

Articles

The title of the article is a deliberate play on architect Robert Venturi's classic of post-modern architectural theory, Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture. The article analyzes metaphorical 'architectures' of copyright and cyberspace using architectural and land use theories developed for the physical world. It applies this analysis to copyright law through the lens of the First Amendment. I argue that the 'simplicity' of digital engineering is undermining desirable 'complexity' in legal and physical structures that regulate expressive works.


The Constitutionality Of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too Long, Jane C. Ginsburg, Wendy J. Gordon, Arthur R. Miller, William F. Patry Jan 2000

The Constitutionality Of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too Long, Jane C. Ginsburg, Wendy J. Gordon, Arthur R. Miller, William F. Patry

Faculty Scholarship

I am Professor William Patry of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I will be the moderator of this star-studded debate on the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.

This panel will try to determine, on the great continuum of limited times that the Constitution prescribes for copyright in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, the term of protection that Congress has actually fixed. In other words: How long is too long? Sonny's bill establishes a term of protection of life plus seventy years for individual authors for works created on or after January 1, 1978. The bill retroactively …