Law Commons^™

Section 365 In The Consumer Context: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue, Michael G. Hillinger, Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger

Faculty Publications

The § 365 consumer debtor case law has a further complication. Much of it arises in the context of the last great bankruptcy frontier, Chapter 13. Until recently, Chapter 11 has occupied the minds and hearts of courts and attorneys. Not any more. And, as attorneys and courts take a closer, harder look at Chapter 13, it is no longer possible to describe it as a “streamlined creditors-can’t-vote Chapter 11”. Chapter 13 is unique, presenting its very own quandaries, not the least of which is how its provisions and § 365 interact. We live in interesting times.

Finding The Constitution: An Economic Analysis Of Tradition's Role In Constitutional Interpretation, Adam C. Pritchard, Todd J. Zywicki

Articles

In this Article, Professor Pritchard and Professor Zywicki examine the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation, a topic that has received significant attention in recent years. After outlining the current debate over the use of tradition, the authors discuss the efficiency purposes of constitutionalism--precommitment and the reduction of agency costs--and demonstrate how the use of tradition in constitutional interpretation can serve these purposes. Rejecting both Justice Scalia's majoritarian model, which focuses on legislative sources of tradition, and Justice Souter's common-law model, which focuses on Supreme Court precedent as a source of tradition, the authors propose an alternative model--the "finding model"-- …

Compelling Arbitration Of Claims Under The Civil Rights Act Of 1866: What Congress Could Not Have Intended, Jean R. Sternlight

Scholarly Works

The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was a very special statute, designed at minimum to eliminate all "badges and incidents of slavery" and to ensure that the freed slaves would be provided with civil rights equal to those of white persons. Its enforcement depends on the availability of a neutral public system of justice. Private arbitration cannot assure these characteristics. Thus, courts should not enforce agreements to arbitrate future disputes that may arise under this statute. This Article, however, does not argue that arbitration of claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 should be prohibited altogether. Disputants who mutually …

Constitutions And Spontaneous Orders: A Response To Professor Mcginnis, Adam C. Pritchard, Todd J. Zywicki

Articles

Professor John McGinnis has written a perceptive and provocative comment on our economic analysis of the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation.1 A brief summary of our areas of agreement and disagreement may help set the stage for this response. It appears that Professor McGinnis substantially agrees with the two central propositions of our article. First, he appears to agree with our definition of efficient traditions as those evolving over long periods of time from decentralized processes.2 Second, he explicitly agrees that Justices Scalia and Souter have adopted sub-optimal models of tradition because they rely on sources that lack the …

The Constitutionality Of Taxing Compensatory Damages For Mental Distress When There Was No Accompanying Physical Injury, Douglas A. Kahn

Articles

Since 1919, statutory tax law has excluded from gross income compensatory damages received on account of a personal injury or sickness.1 The current version of that exclusion is set forth in section 104 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.2 The construction of that exclusion, both by the courts and by the Commissioner, underwent significant alterations over the 80-year period that the provision has existed.3 The statute itself was amended several times, most recently in 1996.4 It is the 1996 amendment that has raised a constitutional issue concerning the validity of a portion of the statute.5

Cleaning Up The Legal Debris Left In The Wake Of Whitewater, Susan Low Bloch

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

We have learned a lot in the twenty-five years since Watergate. During the scandal itself, we confirmed that the President is not above the law. We learned that executive privilege is constitutionally protected, but that it is not absolute. And, we learned that a need exists for an independent counsel, but that we don't necessarily need a statute to establish such an office.

Watergate and the Nixon era spawned several so-called "reforms": the establishment of the independent counsel statute, presidential immunity from civil damage suits for official action, and public ownership of the President's official papers. It is interesting and …