Law Commons^™

15th Annual Environmental Law Institute, Office Of Continuing Legal Education At The University Of Kentucky College Of Law, W. Blaine Early Iii, Timothy J. Hagerty, E. Allen Kyle, Lee Colten, Tom C. Van Arsdall, John R. Leathers, Clinton J. Elliott, Thomas J. Fitzgerald, Jeffrey M. Sanders, Richard H. Underwood, Bradley E. Diillon, Henry L. Stephens, Lauren Anderson, David A. Smart

Continuing Legal Education Materials

Materials from the 15th Annual Environmental Law Institute held by UK/CLE in March 1999.

When Is Command-And-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, And The Comparative Efficiency Of Alternative Regulatory Regimes For Environmental Protection, Daniel H. Cole, Peter Z. Grossman

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Contrary to the conventional wisdom among economists and legal scholars, command-and-control (CAC) environmental regulations are not inherently inefficient or invariably less efficient than alternative "economic" instruments (EI). In fact, CAC regimes can be and have been efficient (producing net social benefits), even more efficient in some cases that alternative EI regimes.

Standard economic accounts of CAC are insensitive to the historical, technological, and institutional contexts that can influence (and sometimes determine) the efficiency of alternative regulatory regimes. A regime that is nominally or relatively efficient in one set of circumstances may be nominally or relatively inefficient in another. In some …

Clearing The Air: Four Propositions About Property Rights And Environmental Protection, Daniel H. Cole

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.