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Articles 1 - 10 of 10

Full-Text Articles in Law

A Primer On Prejudgment Interest, Michael S. Knoll Dec 1996

A Primer On Prejudgment Interest, Michael S. Knoll

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Global Technological Integration, Intellectual Property Rights, And Competition Law: Some Introductory Comments, David J. Gerber Jan 1996

Global Technological Integration, Intellectual Property Rights, And Competition Law: Some Introductory Comments, David J. Gerber

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


International Trade And Competition Law In Japan, David J. Gerber Jan 1996

International Trade And Competition Law In Japan, David J. Gerber

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


A Reliance Damages Approach To Corporate Lockups, David A. Skeel Jr. Jan 1996

A Reliance Damages Approach To Corporate Lockups, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


The Enforceability Of Norms And The Employment Relationship, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter Jan 1996

The Enforceability Of Norms And The Employment Relationship, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Effect Of Regulation On Banking: California 1879-1929, Lynne Doti, Richard Runyon Jan 1996

Effect Of Regulation On Banking: California 1879-1929, Lynne Doti, Richard Runyon

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

California had a virtually unregulated banking environment until the first comprehensive banking regulations were passed in 1905. These regulations, and subsequent changes in 1909, required reserves and paid-up capital. Several tests of commonly accepted measures of safety, such as bank reserves, paid-up capital, bank failures, and real estate loans that resulted in foreclosure, are compared for selected years before and after the regulations. Results do not clearly demonstrate that regulation enhanced the safety of individual banks, but do support the conclusion that regulation enhanced the safety of the banking system as a whole.


America's Shifting Fascination With Comparative Corporate Governance, Edward B. Rock Jan 1996

America's Shifting Fascination With Comparative Corporate Governance, Edward B. Rock

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


An Analysis Of Fee Shifting Based On The Margin Of Victory: On Frivolous Suints, Meritorious Suits, And The Role Of Rule 11, Howard F. Chang, Lucian A. Bebchuk Jan 1996

An Analysis Of Fee Shifting Based On The Margin Of Victory: On Frivolous Suints, Meritorious Suits, And The Role Of Rule 11, Howard F. Chang, Lucian A. Bebchuk

All Faculty Scholarship

When plaintiffs cannot predict the outcome of litigation with certainty, neither the American rule (each litigant bears its own litigation expenses) nor the British rule (the losing litigant pays the attorneys' fees of the winning litigant) would induce optimal decisions to bring suit. Plaintiffs may bring frivolous suits when litigation costs are small relative to the amount at stake; plaintiffs may not bring meritorious suits when litigation costs are large relative to this amount. More general fee-shifting rules are based not only on the identity of the winning party but also on how strong the court perceives the case to …


Book Review. Turbulence!: Challenges And Opportunities In The World Of Work: Are You Prepared For The Future? By Roger E. Herman, Juliet Casper Smith Jan 1996

Book Review. Turbulence!: Challenges And Opportunities In The World Of Work: Are You Prepared For The Future? By Roger E. Herman, Juliet Casper Smith

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Corporate Governance And Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, Ronald J. Gilson Jan 1996

Corporate Governance And Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

Until the 1980s, corporate governance was largely the province of lawyers. It was a world of specific rules – more or less precise statutory requirements governing shareholder meetings, the election of directors, notice requirements and the like – that were essentially unrelated to what corporations actually do. From this perspective, the corporation's productive activity was simply a black box onto which standard governance structures were superimposed with little effect on what took place within. Corporate law was "trivial" or, as Bayless Manning so evocatively portrayed it, simply "great empty corporation statutes – towering skyscrapers of rusted girders internally welded together …