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Chapter 3 - Religion, Rights And Difference In The Early Woman's Rights Movement (Previously Published Article), Elizabeth B. Clark

Manuscript of Women, Church, and State: Religion and the Culture of Individual Rights in Nineteenth-Century America

The meeting of feminists at Seneca Falls in July of 1848 marked the nominal beginning of the movement which in the nineteenth century was labeled "woman's rights." For us that term has become commonly interchangeable with "suffrage," and we often assume that "woman's rights" describes a seventy-odd year campaign to gain civil and political power and protection from a government which -- although it had perpetrated outrages against women and blacks -- had an unquestioned legitimacy as the guarantor and enforcer of rights.

Religion, Rights And Difference In The Early Woman's Rights Movement, Elizabeth B. Clark

Publications

The meeting of feminists at Seneca Falls in July of 1848 marked the nominal beginning of the movement which in the nineteenth century was labeled "woman's rights." For us that term has become commonly interchangeable with "suffrage," and we often assume that "woman's rights" describes a seventy-odd year campaign to gain civil and political power and protection from a government which -- although it had perpetrated outrages against women and blacks -- had an unquestioned legitimacy as the guarantor and enforcer of rights.

Rationalism In Constitutional Law, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.

Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About The Law-As-Literature Movement, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Among other achievements, the modern law-as-literature movement has prompted increasing numbers of legal scholars to embrace the claim that adjudication is interpretation, and more specifically, that constitutional adjudication is interpretation of the Constitution. That adjudication is interpretation -- that an adjudicative act is an interpretive act -- more than any other central commitment, unifies the otherwise diverse strands of the legal and constitutional theory of the late twentieth century.

In this article, I will argue in this article against both modern forms of interpretivism. The analogue of law to literature, on which much of modern interpretivism is based, although fruitful, …

Causation In Torts, Crimes, And Moral Philosophy: A Reply To Professor Thomson, Paul F. Rothstein

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Professor Judith Jarvis Thomson's provocative article, 'The Decline of Cause,' focuses on the diminishing importance of causation in law and moral philosophy. In this reply, I suggest answers to some of the questions Professor Thomson raises.

Professor Thomson's article revolves around various forms of a classic dilemma: two persons take equal care but, through chance, their actions produce different results. Does the outcome of their actions matter in a moral assessment of those actions? Professor Thomson first sets out what the styles as the Kantian and 'moral sophisticates" position that the outcome of an act does not and should not …