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Full-Text Articles in Law
Delay And Its Benefits For Judicial Rulemaking Under Scientific Uncertainty, Rebecca Haw Allensworth
Delay And Its Benefits For Judicial Rulemaking Under Scientific Uncertainty, Rebecca Haw Allensworth
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The Supreme Court’s increasing use of science and social science in its decision-making has a rationalizing effect on law that helps ensure that a rule will have its desired effect. But resting doctrine on the shifting sands of scientific and social scientific opinion endangers legal stability. The Court must be be responsive, but not reactive, to new scientific findings and theories, a difficult balance for lay justices to strike. This Article argues that the Court uses delay — defined as refusing to make or change a rule in light of new scientific arguments at time one, and then making or …
Brain Scans As Evidence: Truths, Proofs, Lies, And Lessons, Owen D. Jones, Francis X. Shen
Brain Scans As Evidence: Truths, Proofs, Lies, And Lessons, Owen D. Jones, Francis X. Shen
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This contribution to the Brain Sciences in the Courtroom Symposium identifies and discusses issues important to admissibility determinations when courts confront brain-scan evidence. Through the vehicle of the landmark 2010 federal criminal trial U.S. v. Semrau (which considered, for the first time, the admissibility of brain scans for lie detection purposes) this article highlights critical evidentiary issues involving: 1) experimental design; 2) ecological and external validity; 3) subject compliance with researcher instructions; 4) false positives; and 5) drawing inferences about individuals from group data. The article’s lessons are broadly applicable to the new wave of neurolaw cases now being seen …
The Right To Voice Reprised, Christopher Slobogin
The Right To Voice Reprised, Christopher Slobogin
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This article appears in a symposium issue of Seton Hall Law Review on courtroom epistemology. In Proving the Unprovable: The Role of Law, Science and Speculation in Adjudicating Culpability and Dangerousness, I argued that criminal defendants ought to be able to present speculative psychiatric testimony if the expert has followed a routinized evaluation process that addresses the relevant legal criterion, an argument based in part on the position that the Constitution can be read to entitle defendants to tell their exculpatory mental state stories. In a recent essay, Professor Lillquist takes aim at this latter rationale, which I called the …
Independent Judicial Research In The "Daubert" Age, Edward K. Cheng
Independent Judicial Research In The "Daubert" Age, Edward K. Cheng
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The Supreme Court's Daubert trilogy places judges in the unenviable position of assessing the reliability of often unfamiliar and complex scientific expert testimony. Over the past decade, scholars have therefore explored various ways of helping judges with their new gatekeeping responsibilities. Unfortunately, the two dominant approaches, which focus on doctrinal tests and external assistance mechanisms, have been largely ineffective. This Article advocates for a neglected but important method for improving scientific decision making-independent judicial research. It argues that judges facing unfamiliar and complex scientific admissibility decisions can and should engage in independent library research to better educate themselves about the …
Does Frye Or Daubert Matter? A Study Of Scientific Admissibility Standards, Edward K. Cheng, Albert Yoon
Does Frye Or Daubert Matter? A Study Of Scientific Admissibility Standards, Edward K. Cheng, Albert Yoon
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Nearly every treatment of scientific evidence begins with a faithful comparison between the Frye and Daubert standards. Since 1993, jurists and legal scholars have spiritedly debated which standard is preferable and whether particular states should adopt one standard or the other. These efforts beg the question: Does a state's choice of scientific admissibility standard matter? A growing number of scholars suspect that the answer is no. Under this theory, the import of the Supreme Court's Daubert decision was not in its doctrinal standard, but rather in the general consciousness it raised about the problems of unreliable scientific evidence. This Article …