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Series

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

1999

Corporate governance

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Law

Team Production In Business Organizations: An Introduction, Margaret M. Blair, Lynn A. Stout Jan 1999

Team Production In Business Organizations: An Introduction, Margaret M. Blair, Lynn A. Stout

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

For the past two decades, legal and economic scholarship has tended to assume that the central economic problem addressed by corporation law is getting managers and directors to act as faithful agents for shareholders. There are other important economic problems faced by business firms, however. This article introduces a Symposium that explores one of those alternate economic problems: the problem of "team production". Team production problems can arise whenever three conditions are met: (1) economic production requires the combined inputs of two or more individuals; (2) at least some of these inputs are "team-specific," meaning they have a significantly higher …


The Effect Of Shareholder Proposals On Executive Compensation, Randall Thomas, Kenneth J. Martin Jan 1999

The Effect Of Shareholder Proposals On Executive Compensation, Randall Thomas, Kenneth J. Martin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

During the last decade, the stratospheric increases in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay levels have made executive compensation a popular target for shareholder activism, particularly when high pay is accompanied by poor corporate performance. Outraged investors have made their views know to corporate boards of directors using shareholder proposals, binding bylaw amendments, "Just Vote No" campaigns, and other activist efforts. As institutional and other shareholders have attempted to monitor board decisions, the question remains: Have their efforts been successful in influencing executive compensation?