Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch
Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch
Scholarly Works
Adequate representation in securities class actions is, at best, an afterthought and, at worst, usurped and subsumed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s lead-plaintiff appointment process. Once appointed, the lead plaintiff bears a crushing burden: Congress expects her to monitor the attorney, thwart strike suits, and deter fraud, while judges expect her appointment as the “most adequate plaintiff” to resolve intra-class conflicts and adequate-representation problems. But even if she could be all things to all people, the lead plaintiff has little authority to do much aside from appointing lead counsel. Plus, class members in securities-fraud cases have diverse preferences …
When Foreigners Infringe Patents: An Empirical Look At The Involvement Of Foreign Defendants In Patent Litigation In The U.S., Marketa Trimble
When Foreigners Infringe Patents: An Empirical Look At The Involvement Of Foreign Defendants In Patent Litigation In The U.S., Marketa Trimble
Scholarly Works
This paper presents results from a multiple-year project concerned with the involvement of foreign (non-U.S.) entities in U.S. patent litigation. A comparison of data from 2004 and 2009 that cover 5,407 patent cases filed in U.S. federal district courts in those two years evidences an increase in the number of cases involving foreign defendants, and thus an increasing potential for cross-border enforcement problems. With this basic finding the research supports the proposition advanced by a number of intellectual property scholars in the U.S. and abroad that rules need to be established to facilitate a smooth process for recognition and enforcement …
Joint Defense Or Research Joint Venture? Reassessing The Patent-Challenge-Bloc's Antitrust Status, Joseph S. Miller
Joint Defense Or Research Joint Venture? Reassessing The Patent-Challenge-Bloc's Antitrust Status, Joseph S. Miller
Scholarly Works
A patent challenger who defeats a patent wins spoils that it must share with the world, including all its competitors. This forced sharing undercuts an alleged infringer's incentive to stay in the fight to the finish - especially if the patent owner offers an attractive settlement. Too many settlements, and too few definitive patent challenges, are the result. I have argued previously that a litigation-stage bounty would help correct this tilt against patent challenges, for it would provide cash prizes to successful patent challengers that they alone would enjoy. Even the best-designed bounty, however, would likely fail to encourage patent …