Law Commons^™

Difficult Questions For The Senate Minority, John M. Greabe

Law Faculty Scholarship

This column is the first in a biweekly Constitutional Connections series that will examine the constitutional implications of various topics in the news. The author, John Greabe, teaches constitutional law and related subject at the University of New Hampshire School of Law. He also serves on the board of trustees of the New Hampshire Institute for Civics Education.

My Turn: 'We The People' And The Garland Nomination, John M. Greabe

Law Faculty Scholarship

[Excerpt] "Because I teach constitutional law, a friend recently asked me whether Judge Merrick Garland or President Obama might successfully sue to compel the Senate to take action on the nomination of Judge Garland to fill the vacancy on the United States Supreme Court.

Almost certainly not, I told him. Under settled precedent, a judge would dismiss such a case as raising a non-legal ''political" question. It would be very difficult to develop acceptable decisional standards for such a claim. Moreover, courts are reluctant to entertain lawsuits challenging mechanisms that the Senate uses to oversee the judiciary."

Executive Power And The Scotus Argument On President Obama’S Immigration Plan, Peter Margulies

Law Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Religious Discrimination Based On Employer Misperception, Dallan F. Flake

Law Faculty Scholarship

This Article addresses the circuit split over whether Title VII prohibits discrimination based on an employer's misperception of an employee's religion. This is an especially critical issue because misperception-based religious discrimination is likely to increase as the United States continues to experience unprecedented religious diversification. Some courts read Title VII narrowly to preclude such claims, reasoning that the statutory text only prohibits discrimination based on an individual's actual religion. Other courts interpret the statute more expansively in concluding such claims are cognizable because the employer's intent is equally malicious in misperception and conventional discrimination cases. I argue that the statutory …