Law Commons^™

Process Theory, Majoritarianism, And The Original Understanding, William Michael Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In Radicals in Robes, Cass Sunstein posits that there are four primary approaches to constitutional interpretation: perfectionism, majoritarianism, minimalism, and fundamentalism.' The purpose of his eloquent and compelling book is twofold: Sunstein argues for minimalism, an approach that he contends makes most sense for America today; and with even greater force, Sunstein argues against fundamentalism, which he finds "wrong, dangerous, radical, and occasionally hypocritical."' The "Radicals in Robes" who are the targets of Sunstein's book are judges who embrace fundamentalism, which, in his view, embodies "the views of the extreme wing of [the] Republican Party."'

In Securing Constitutional Democracy: The …

Impacts Of White, Roy A. Schotland

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Changes in judicial elections stem from four identifiable causes. First, court decisions involve increasingly higher stakes and more serious consequences. The U.S. Senate confirmation battles also reflect this cause. Second, non-candidate groups, many from out of state, bring in enormous sums of money which often leads to ugly, even damaging, campaigns. Third, the first two causes are making judicial campaigns more like non-judicial campaigns, bringing new elements to judicial campaigns: campaign consultants and a win-at-any-cost approach.

The Original Meaning Of The Judicial Power, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this paper, the author refutes any claim that judicial review was invented in Marbury v. Madison, or that, because it is contrary to the original meaning of the Constitution, it must be justified by some nonoriginalist interpretive methodology. He will do so, not by discerning the shadowy and often counterfactual "intentions" of the founding generation, but by presenting as comprehensively as he can what the founders actually said during the constitutional convention, in state ratification conventions, and immediately after ratification. These statements, taken cumulatively, leave no doubt that the founders contemplated judicial nullification of legislation enacted by the …

Comment On Professor Carrington's Article "The Independence And Democratic Accountability Of The Supreme Court Of Ohio", Roy A. Schotland

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In my view, whether or not Article III is written as members of a new constitutional convention might write it, there is nothing more fundamental to the way our entire judicial system operates (including in many ways, although indirectly, our state courts) than federal judges being as independent as law can make them. Perhaps I suffer from Burkean skepticism about reform of long-standing institutions, or perhaps I am merely a supporter of the status quo. But I believe that, despite obvious drawbacks in giving anyone life tenure in any job, we gain far more than we lose by making federal …

Myth, Reality Past And Present, And Judicial Elections, Roy A. Schotland

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Why do we have judicial elections? A democracy without elections for the legislature and executive (or, in parliamentary systems, for the executive as the leadership of the elected legislators), would be simply inconceivable. But no one would deny that eleven of our states, or many other nations, are democracies even though they do not elect judges. It might follow from that irrefutable, fundamental difference between elections for judges and for other offices, that judicial elections should not-or more to the point, need not-be conducted the same as other elections. Before we soar into debate, let us lay a foundation with …

Regulatory Takings And "Judicial Supremacy", J. Peter Byrne

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The thesis of this Article is that the Court of Federal Claims and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have become exposed to this classic critique of constitutional decision-making through the recent expansions of the regulatory takings doctrine. Though the chief agent for this expansion has been the Supreme Court, these lower courts have made their own prominent contributions to broadening regulatory takings, and they are far more vulnerable to political reprisals. Like the Due Process Clause in the gilded age, the Takings Clause today can easily be and has been seen as an avenue for inappropriate judicial …