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Full-Text Articles in Law

Presidential Control Of Administrative Agencies: A Debate Over Law Or Politics?, Cary Coglianese Feb 2010

Presidential Control Of Administrative Agencies: A Debate Over Law Or Politics?, Cary Coglianese

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Unitary Executive During The Third Half-Century, 1889-1945, Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi, Laurence D. Nee Jan 2005

The Unitary Executive During The Third Half-Century, 1889-1945, Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi, Laurence D. Nee

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Recent Supreme Court decisions and the impeachment of President Clinton has reinvigorated the debate over Congress's authority to employ devices such as special counsels and independent agencies to restrict the President's control over the administration of the law. The initial debate focused on whether the Constitution rejected the executive by committee employed by the Articles of the Confederation in favor of a unitary executive, in which all administrative authority is centralized in the President. More recently, the debate has begun to turn towards historical practices. Some scholars have suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have become such ...


The Unitary Executive During The Second Half-Century, Steven G. Calabresi, Christopher S. Yoo Jan 2003

The Unitary Executive During The Second Half-Century, Steven G. Calabresi, Christopher S. Yoo

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Recent Supreme Court decisions and political events have reinvigorated the debate over Congress's authority to restrict the President's control over the administration of the law. The initial debate focused on whether the Constitutional Convention rejected the executive by committee employed by the Articles of the Confederation in favor of a unitary executive in which all administrative authority is centralized in the President. More recently, the debate has turned towards historical practices. Some scholars have suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have become such established features of the constitutional landscape as to preempt arguments in favor of the ...


What Do We Mean By "Judicial Independence"?, Stephen B. Burbank Jan 2003

What Do We Mean By "Judicial Independence"?, Stephen B. Burbank

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

In this article, the author argues that the concept of "judicial independence" has served more as an object of rhetoric than it has of sustained study. He views the scholarly literatures that treat it as ships passing in the night, each subject to weaknesses that reflect the needs and fashions of the discipline, but all tending to ignore courts other than the Supreme Court of the United States. Seeking both greater rigor and greater flexibility than one usually finds in public policy debates about, and in the legal and political science literatures on, judicial independence, the author attributes much of ...


Lines In The Sand: The Importance Of Borders In American Federalism, Seth F. Kreimer Jan 2002

Lines In The Sand: The Importance Of Borders In American Federalism, Seth F. Kreimer

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Public Benefits And Federal Authorization For Alienage Discrimination By The States, Howard F. Chang Jan 2002

Public Benefits And Federal Authorization For Alienage Discrimination By The States, Howard F. Chang

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The New Etiquette Of Federalism: New York, Printz, And Yeskey, Matthew D. Adler, Seth F. Kreimer Jan 1999

The New Etiquette Of Federalism: New York, Printz, And Yeskey, Matthew D. Adler, Seth F. Kreimer

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Unitary Executive During The First Half-Century, Steven G. Calabresi, Christopher S. Yoo Jan 1997

The Unitary Executive During The First Half-Century, Steven G. Calabresi, Christopher S. Yoo

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Recent Supreme Court decisions and the impeachment of President Clinton has reinvigorated the debate over Congress’s authority to employ devices such as special counsels and independent agencies to restrict the President’s control over the administration of the law. The initial debate focused on whether the Constitution rejected the “executive by committee” employed by the Articles of the Confederation in favor of a “unitary executive,” in which all administrative authority is centralized in the President. More recently, the debate has begun to turn towards historical practices. Some scholars have suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have become such ...


Ways To Think About The Unitary Executive: A Comment On Approaches To Government Structure, Michael A. Fitts Jan 1993

Ways To Think About The Unitary Executive: A Comment On Approaches To Government Structure, Michael A. Fitts

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


Retaining The Rule Of Law In A Chevron World, Michael A. Fitts Jan 1990

Retaining The Rule Of Law In A Chevron World, Michael A. Fitts

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.