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Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

2005

Management Discretion

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Why Defer To Managers? A Strong-Form Efficiency Model, Richard E. Kihlstrom, Michael L. Wachter Jul 2005

Why Defer To Managers? A Strong-Form Efficiency Model, Richard E. Kihlstrom, Michael L. Wachter

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

We compare the efficiency with which management discretion and shareholder choice regulate hostile tender offers. This is the first paper in a long running debate that rigorously compares these legal rules to analyze both the critical informational assumptions and the interplay of those assumptions with principles of financial market efficiency. A critical innovation of our model is its focus on an informed management’s choice among alternative corporate policies under the protection of the business judgment rule, but where agency costs exist. We assume that corporate assets and reinvestment opportunities are efficiently priced by financial markets, but that markets never ...