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Full-Text Articles in Law

Tradable Pollution Permits And The Regulatory Game, Jason S. Johnston Nov 2005

Tradable Pollution Permits And The Regulatory Game, Jason S. Johnston

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This paper analyzes polluters' incentives to move from a traditional command and control (CAC) environmental regulatory regime to a tradable permits (TPP) regime. Existing work in environmental economics does not model how firms contest and bargain over actual regulatory implementation in CAC regimes, and therefore fail to compare TPP regimes with any CAC regime that is actually observed. This paper models CAC environmental regulation as a bargaining game over pollution entitlements. Using a reduced form model of the regulatory contest, it shows that CAC regulatory bargaining likely generates a regulatory status quo under which firms with the highest compliance costs ...


The Promise And Limits Of Voluntary Management - Based Regulatory Reform: An Analysis Of Epa's Strategic Goals Program, Jason S. Johnston Aug 2005

The Promise And Limits Of Voluntary Management - Based Regulatory Reform: An Analysis Of Epa's Strategic Goals Program, Jason S. Johnston

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This paper presents a case study of a voluntary environmental program initiated by the U.S. EPA in the late 1990's, the Strategic Goals Program (SGP). This program was intended to create incentives for job shop metal finishers, an industry of small and medium sized enterprises, to improve and even go beyond compliance with existing federal regulations by investing in pollution prevention. The SGP's incentives included direct technical assistance and limited financial assistance, but the primary carrot it offered participants was more flexible regulatory treatment by state and local regulators. Although SGP clearly helped some firms discover ways ...


Signaling Social Responsibility: On The Law And Economics Of Market Incentives For Corporate Environmental Performance, Jason S. Johnston May 2005

Signaling Social Responsibility: On The Law And Economics Of Market Incentives For Corporate Environmental Performance, Jason S. Johnston

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This article analyzes the law and economics of market internalization: the capability of markets to both penalize and reward firms for their environmental, health and safety performance. As for market sticks, the article maintains that market transactions - both private and public sales of corporate assets as well as transactions in publicly traded securities - are an important avenue through which firms realize comparative advantages in regulatory compliance, and that such transactions have the potential to significantly enhance corporate environmental and social performance. Asset transactions tend to drive environmental cleanup and transfer assets to firms that are better able to know about ...


Management-Based Strategies For Improving Private Sector Environmental Performance, Cary Coglianese, Jennifer Nash Mar 2005

Management-Based Strategies For Improving Private Sector Environmental Performance, Cary Coglianese, Jennifer Nash

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

Improvements in environmental quality depend in large measure on changes in private sector management. In recognition of this fact, government and industry have begun in recent years to focus directly on shaping the internal management practices of private firms. New management-based strategies can take many forms, but unlike conventional regulatory approaches they are linked by their distinctive focus on management practices, rather than on environmental technologies or emissions targets. This article offers the first sustained analysis of both public and private sector initiatives designed specifically to improve firms' environmental management. Synthesizing the results of a conference of leading scholars and ...


Environmental Trade Measures, The Shrimp-Turtle Rulings, And The Ordinary Meaning Of The Text Of The Gatt, Howard F. Chang Jan 2005

Environmental Trade Measures, The Shrimp-Turtle Rulings, And The Ordinary Meaning Of The Text Of The Gatt, Howard F. Chang

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

No abstract provided.


The Rule Of Capture And The Economic Dynamics Of Natural Resource Use And Survival Under Open Access Management Regimes, Jason S. Johnston Jan 2005

The Rule Of Capture And The Economic Dynamics Of Natural Resource Use And Survival Under Open Access Management Regimes, Jason S. Johnston

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

By reviewing the bioeconomic dynamics of natural resource harvest under open access/rule of capture management, this article demonstrates the falsity of the widely held contemporary view that market incentives lead to unsustainable natural resource use. The formal bioeconomic models teach that it is the relative speed of market versus natural dynamics that determines when and if open access harvest leads to resource collapse. If the rate at which harvesters exit from the harvest industry when harvests are low is rapid relative to the natural rate of growth in the harvested stock, the level of both the resource stock and ...