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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories Of Tort Liability Adapt To The Realities Of Cost Containment?, Barbara A. Noah
The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories Of Tort Liability Adapt To The Realities Of Cost Containment?, Barbara A. Noah
Faculty Scholarship
Over the years, the United States health care system has undergone a transformation from a market comprised mainly of self employed physicians· in solo or small group practices to one in which far fewer physicians engage in this type of independent practice. More than three quarters of the physicians in this country now practice medicine within some form of managed care organization ("MCO") or see some managed care patients. The public increasingly perceives the care provided through MCOs as inferior to traditional feefor-service care. Responding to constituent pressures, legislatures in more than twenty states recently have considered bills regulating managed …
Reviving Jacob And Youngs, Inc. V. Kent: Material Breach Doctrine Reconsidered, Amy B. Cohen
Reviving Jacob And Youngs, Inc. V. Kent: Material Breach Doctrine Reconsidered, Amy B. Cohen
Faculty Scholarship
Determining whether a material breach has occurred under current law involves a weighing of several factors, a determination that often seems either completely without logic or precision, or self-evident and conclusory. Thus, parties are left not knowing what to do and what risks they may be assuming. The problem with the current application of material breach doctrine is in large part a result of an absence of focus. The courts apply the test without articulating any foundation or context on which it is based. The law in this area could be much improved if courts would return to Judge Cardozo's …
Shareholder Enforced Market Discipline: How Much Is Too Much?, Eric J. Gouvin
Shareholder Enforced Market Discipline: How Much Is Too Much?, Eric J. Gouvin
Faculty Scholarship
This Article considers the federal banking regulation regime implemented in response to the widespread bank failures of the 1980s and early 1990s. The first section of the Article examines the moral hazard problem created by the presence of the deposit insurance scheme and the market discipline debate that has attempted to correct the moral hazard problem. The Author argues that the law has evolved to make bank holding companies the primary enforcers of market discipline. The Article’s second section examines the specific regulatory changes that have been designed to create an incentive for bank holding companies to impose discipline on …