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Series

Faculty Scholarship

Western New England University School of Law

Banking and Finance Law

Articles 1 - 11 of 11

Full-Text Articles in Law

The Magic Of Money And Banking, Eric J. Gouvin Jan 2010

The Magic Of Money And Banking, Eric J. Gouvin

Faculty Scholarship

This chapter analyzes the banking system in the wizarding world of Harry Potter and compares it to the salient features of the banking system in the Muggle world. The chapter begins with a brief history of money. Although the economies in both the wizarding world and the Muggle world use money, there are striking differences between those worlds on this point. We can only speculate on why these differences exist, but it appears that the wizard concept of money stopped evolving in the Middle Ages, when bankers were really just trusted keepers of valuables. The chapter concludes that although Muggle …

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Bank Mergers In North America: Comparing The Approaches In The United States And Canada, Eric J. Gouvin Jan 2005

Bank Mergers In North America: Comparing The Approaches In The United States And Canada, Eric J. Gouvin

Faculty Scholarship

This Article provides a summary comparison of the processes in the United States and Canada for governmental approval of bank mergers. The topic came to prominence in 1998 when four of Canada's five largest banks unveiled plans that would have resulted in the Royal Bank of Canada merging with the Bank of Montreal and the Toronto Dominion Bank combining with the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce ("CIBC"). These proposed mergers were rejected by the then Finance Minister, Paul Martin. The reasons given included: (1) the resulting banking industry structure would have concentrated too much economic power in the hands of …

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Are There Any Checks And Balances On The Government's Power To Check Our Balances? The Fate Of Financial Privacy In The War On Terrorism, Eric J. Gouvin Jan 2005

Are There Any Checks And Balances On The Government's Power To Check Our Balances? The Fate Of Financial Privacy In The War On Terrorism, Eric J. Gouvin

Faculty Scholarship

In the three years since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the laws affecting money laundering and financial privacy in the United States have been changed to give law enforcement agencies easier access to financial information. Although the changes to the law were passed with the claim that they were needed to intercept terrorist financing, the anti-money laundering provisions enacted by the USA PATRIOT Act are being used routinely against non-terrorist criminal suspects as part of regular law enforcement processes. Although the apprehension of ordinary criminals by any means available will sound perfectly ceptable to many, it is at …

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Bringing Out The Big Guns: The Usa Patriot Act, Money Laundering, And The War On Terrorism, Eric J. Gouvin Jan 2003

Bringing Out The Big Guns: The Usa Patriot Act, Money Laundering, And The War On Terrorism, Eric J. Gouvin

Faculty Scholarship

This Article addresses the question of whether the money laundering provisions in the Patriot Act will be effective tools in the effort to intercept terrorist financing to prevent future attacks like those suffered on September 11, 2001, or whether the legislation is instead the modern equivalent of a big noisy anti-aircraft gun -- psychologically useful for showing that something is being done, but not very effective in actually doing the task. This Article concludes that the Act's money laundering provisions will not be effective in intercepting terrorist financing. It reaches that conclusion after examining the current state of United States …

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Financial Holding Company Liability After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Eric J. Gouvin Jan 2002

Financial Holding Company Liability After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, Eric J. Gouvin

Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines the extent to which financial holding companies formed under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB Act) will bear the costs of the failure of their bank subsidiaries. Pre-GLB Act banking law provided numerous ways to impose liability on bank holding companies for bank failure. The GLB Act itself added some provisions dealing with holding company liability, providing protections for receivers of failed institutions and adding ammunition to the regulators' "source of strength" theory for imposing liability on bank holding companies, and, by extension, on financial holding companies. But despite tinkering at the edges, the GLB Act did not provide …

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The Political Economy Of Canada's "Widely Held" Rule For Large Banks, Eric J. Gouvin Jan 2001

The Political Economy Of Canada's "Widely Held" Rule For Large Banks, Eric J. Gouvin

Faculty Scholarship

All of the recent changes in foreign access to Canada's banking market have been essentially cosmetic-appearing to make foreign access more liberal while in reality changing the status quo very little. On one point, the so-called widely held rule, Canada does not even bother to pretend that its banking law is friendly to foreign entrants. Under this rule, no person or group may control ten percent or more of a Schedule I bank unless one first obtains the approval of the Minster of Finance. This rule makes foreign acquisition of a Schedule I bank virtually impossible. The widely held rule …

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Cross-Border Bank Branching Under The Nafta: Public Choice And The Law Of Corporate Groups, Eric J. Gouvin Jan 1999

Cross-Border Bank Branching Under The Nafta: Public Choice And The Law Of Corporate Groups, Eric J. Gouvin

Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines a question left unresolved after the negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): whether the banks of the member countries should be permitted to engage in the business of banking in the other member countries simply by branching across national borders. Under present law, the United States permits branching subject to extensive restrictions, while Canada and Mexico permit access to their banking markets only by acquisition or establishment of institutions chartered in their countries. While the NAFTA does not provide for unfettered branching across national borders, article 1403(3) of the NAFTA left the issue of …

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Of Hungry Wolves And Horizontal Conflicts: Rethinking The Justifications For Bank Holding Company Liability, Eric J. Gouvin Jan 1999

Of Hungry Wolves And Horizontal Conflicts: Rethinking The Justifications For Bank Holding Company Liability, Eric J. Gouvin

Faculty Scholarship

To what extent should bank holding companies bear the costs of bank failure? Current banking law provides a number of ways to impose liability on bank holding companies for bank failure. Those devices, however, have developed haphazardly and sometimes rest on inconsistent theoretical foundations. This Article critiques the regulatory justifications that have been offered for holding company liability and offers an alternative justification for imposing liability on holding companies based on the idea that directors of bank subsidiaries suffer from an especially difficult form of horizontal conflict--the situation where the board of directors owes several different duties and chooses to …

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Banking In North America: The Triumph Of Public Choice Over Public Policy, Eric J. Gouvin Jan 1998

Banking In North America: The Triumph Of Public Choice Over Public Policy, Eric J. Gouvin

Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines the state of cross-border banking in the NAFTA countries and the question of whether member country banks should be permitted to branch freely throughout North America. Under present law, the United States permits foreign banks to branch into its territory subject to extensive restrictions, Canada has indicated that it plans to eliminate some restrictions on foreign branching, and Mexico continues to permit access to its banking markets only by investment in or establishment of an institution chartered in Mexico. Article 1403(3) of the NAFTA left the issue of cross-border branching open to subsequent negotiation. If the decision …

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Shareholder Enforced Market Discipline: How Much Is Too Much?, Eric J. Gouvin Jan 1997

Shareholder Enforced Market Discipline: How Much Is Too Much?, Eric J. Gouvin

Faculty Scholarship

This Article considers the federal banking regulation regime implemented in response to the widespread bank failures of the 1980s and early 1990s. The first section of the Article examines the moral hazard problem created by the presence of the deposit insurance scheme and the market discipline debate that has attempted to correct the moral hazard problem. The Author argues that the law has evolved to make bank holding companies the primary enforcers of market discipline. The Article’s second section examines the specific regulatory changes that have been designed to create an incentive for bank holding companies to impose discipline on …

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Truth In Savings And The Failure Of Legislative Methodology, Eric J. Gouvin Jan 1994

Truth In Savings And The Failure Of Legislative Methodology, Eric J. Gouvin

Faculty Scholarship

The federal Truth in Savings Act (Truth in Savings) provides one example of failed legislative problem solving. On its face, Truth in Savings is a congressional attempt to solve constituents' problems. The statute, however, appears unlikely to resolve the issues presented to Congress and may even create new and unintended problems that will make matters worse. Truth in Savings, like many other legislative efforts, fails adequately to address constituents' problems because the methodology employed by legislative drafters suffers from a fundamental flaw - it has no built-in mechanism to define rigorously the problem being addressed. Without first identifying the problem, …

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