Law Commons^™

Changing The Tax Code To Create Consumer-Driven Health Insurance Competition, Regina Herzlinger, Barak D. Richman

Faculty Scholarship

Because current tax laws exclude employer-paid health insurance premiums from employees’ taxable wages and income, employer-sponsored insurance remains the primary source of health insurance for most employed Americans. Economists have long blamed the employer-based insurance tax exclusion for inflating health care costs, and, more recently, for constraining income growth and exacerbating income inequality.

We execute a simulation to test the effect of permitting employees to receive their employers’ premium contribution directly and then purchase health insurance themselves, using tax-free funds. Employees could deduct for income tax purposes the amount used for insurance and, if they spend less than the amount …

N.C. Medicaid Reform: A Bipartisan Path Forward, Barak D. Richman, Allison Rice

Faculty Scholarship

The North Carolina Medicaid program currently constitutes 32% of the state budget and provides insurance coverage to 18% of the state’s population. At the same time, 13% of North Carolinians remain uninsured, and even among the insured, significant health disparities persist across income, geography, education, and race.

The Duke University Bass Connections Medicaid Reform project gathered to consider how North Carolina could use its limited Medicaid dollars more effectively to reduce the incidence of poor health, improve access to healthcare, and reduce budgetary pressures on the state’s taxpayers.

This report is submitted to North Carolina’s policymakers and citizens. It assesses …

Concentration In Health Care Markets: Chronic Problems And Better Solutions, Barak D. Richman

Faculty Scholarship

Health care providers with market power enjoy substantially more pricing freedom than monopolists in other markets, for a reason not generally recognized: US-style health insurance. Consequently, monopolies in health care cause undesirable redistribution of wealth and inefficient allocation of resources, both of which burden consumers at levels beyond those of other monopolists. The unusual costliness of monopoly power in health care markets demands far more policy attention than it has received. For starters, the health sector needs a more aggressive antitrust policy that effectively prevents the creation of new provider market power through mergers, alliances, or government immunity. An immediate …

Valuing Health Care: Improving Productivity And Quality, Barak D. Richman, Arti K. Rai

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Who Pays? Who Benefits? Unfairness In American Health Care, Clark C. Havighurst, Barak D. Richman

Faculty Scholarship

American-style health insurance greatly amplifies price-gouging opportunities for health care providers, who inflate prices both to enrich themselves and to subsidize and expand the nation’s health care enterprise. To the extent that lower- and middle-income Americans with private health coverage pay premiums that go to support and expand the system, they are subject to an unfair (regressive) “head tax” levied by unaccountable entities for ostensibly public but also private purposes. Lower-income premium payers also often pay for costly health coverage designed to suit the economic interests and values of professional and other elites rather than their own. They also appear …

A Cautious Path Forward On Accountable Care Organizations, Barak D. Richman, Kevin A. Schulman

Faculty Scholarship

The wave of new Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), spurred by financial incentives in the Affordable Care Act, could become the latest chapter in the steady accumulation of market power by hospitals, health care systems, and physician groups. The main purpose behind forming many ACOs may not be to achieve cost savings but instead to strengthen negotiating power over purchasers in the private sector. This would be an unfortunate sequel to the waves of mergers in the 1990s when health care entities sought to counter market pressure from managed care organizations. The possibility that ACOs might further concentrate health care markets …

The Provider-Monopoly Problem In Health Care, Clark C. Havighurst, Barak D. Richman

Faculty Scholarship

Although federal judges have resisted giving due effect to standard antitrust principles in scrutinizing mergers of nonprofit hospitals, the presence of health insurance makes it especially important to oppose monopoly in health services markets. U.S.-style health insurance gives monopolist providers extraordinary pricing freedom, thus exacerbating monopoly’s usual redistributive effects. Significant allocative inefficiencies - albeit not the kind generally associated with monopoly - also result when the monopolist is a nonprofit hospital. Because it is probably impossible to undo past hospital mergers creating undue market power, we suggest some alternative remedies. One is to apply antitrust rules against "tying" arrangements so …