Law Commons^™

Judicial Decision Making In A World Of Natural Law And Natural Rights, George C. Christie

Faculty Scholarship

This article was my contribution to a symposium celebrating the achievements of John Finnis held at the Villanova University School of Law. Finnis’ greatest work is his Natural Law and Natural Rights. I agree with Finnis’ rejection of an approach to natural law which focuses on the notion of natural rights. Finnis’ approach instead focuses on a natural law that is based on the idea that there are certain basic human goods such as the search for knowledge, the maintenance of life, the sharing of fellowship with other human beings, the capacity to enjoy aesthetic experiences, and the exercise …

Personal Rights And Rule Dependence: Can The Two Co-Exist?, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

Constitutional doctrine is typically "rule-dependent." Typically, a constitutional litigant will not prevail unless she can show that a particular kind of legal rule is in force, e.g., a rule that discriminates against "suspect classes" in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, or that targets speech in violation of the First Amendment, or that is motivated by a religious purpose in violation of the Establishment Clause. Further, the litigant must typically establish a violation of her "personal rights." The Supreme Court has consistently stated that a reviewing court should not invalidate an unconstitutional governmental action at the instance of a claimant …

Rights And Rules: An Overview, Matthew D. Adler, Michael C. Dorf

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Rights, Rules And The Structure Of Constitutional Adjudication: A Response To Professor Fallon, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

Constitutional doctrine is typically rule-dependent. A viable constitutional challenge typically hinges upon the existence of a discriminatory, overbroad, improperly motivated, or otherwise invalid rule, to which the claimant has some nexus. In a prior article, Prof. Adler proposed one model of constitutional adjudication that tries to make sense of rule-dependence. He argued that reviewing courts are not vindicating the personal rights of claimants, but rather are repealing or amending invalid rules. IN a Commentary in this issue, Professor Fallon now puts forward a different model of constitutional adjudication, equally consistent with rule-dependence. Fallon proposes that a reviewing court should overturn …

Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure Of American Constitutional Law, Matthew D. Adler

Faculty Scholarship

Constitutional rights are conventionally thought to be "personal" rights. The successful constitutional litigant is thought to have a valid claim that some constitutional wrong has or would be been done "to her"; the case of "overbreadth," where a litigant prevails even though her own conduct is permissibly regulated, is thought to be unique to the First Amendment. This "personal" or "as-applied" view of constitutional adjudication has been consistently and pervasively endorsed by the Supreme Court, and is standardly adopted by legal scholars.

In this Article, I argue that the conventional view is incorrect. Constitutional rights, I claim, are rights against …

Book Review, Michael E. Tigar

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.