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Full-Text Articles in Law
Debacle: How The Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law And How It Might Yet Be Mended, Frank O. Bowman Iii
Debacle: How The Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law And How It Might Yet Be Mended, Frank O. Bowman Iii
Faculty Publications
This Article argues that the line of Supreme Court Sixth Amendment jury right cases that began with McMillan v. Pennsylvania in 1986, crescendoed in Blakely v. Washington and United States v. Booker in 2004-2005, and continued in 2009 in cases such as Oregon v. Ice, has been a colossal judicial failure. First, the Court has failed to provide a logically coherent, constitutionally based answer to the fundamental question of what limits the Constitution places on the roles played by the institutional actors in the criminal justice system. It failed to recognize that defining, adjudicating and punishing crimes implicates both the …
Filling The Due Process Donut Hole: Abuse And Neglect Cases Between Disposition And Permanency, Josh Gupta-Kagan
Filling The Due Process Donut Hole: Abuse And Neglect Cases Between Disposition And Permanency, Josh Gupta-Kagan
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
The Civil Case At The Heart Of Criminal Procedure: In Re Winship, Stigma, And The Civil-Criminal Distinction, W. David Ball
The Civil Case At The Heart Of Criminal Procedure: In Re Winship, Stigma, And The Civil-Criminal Distinction, W. David Ball
Faculty Publications
In criminal cases, any fact which increases the maximum punishment must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This rule, which comes from Apprendi v. New Jersey, looks to what facts do, not what they are called; in Justice Scalia’s memorable turn of phrase, it applies whether the legislature has labeled operant facts “elements, enhancements, or Mary Jane.” Civil statutes, however, can expose an individual to the same or greater deprivation of liberty on identical facts without needing to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. If Apprendi is, indeed, functional, why is it limited to …
Understanding Caperton: Judicial Disqualification Under The Due Process Clause, Dmitry Bam
Understanding Caperton: Judicial Disqualification Under The Due Process Clause, Dmitry Bam
Faculty Publications
It is virtually impossible to discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. without hearing some variant of the following response: “I can’t believe it was as close as it was.” And it does not matter whether you are chatting with your next-door neighbor who had never thought about judicial ethics in his life or discussing the case with a judicial-recusal expert. Nearly everyone seems to agree: Caperton was an “easy” case and that four justices dissented is an indication that there is something terribly wrong. Not only has Caperton elevated the issue of judicial impartiality …