Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
- Keyword
-
- Economic incentives (2)
- Emissions trading (2)
- Instrument choice (2)
- Market mechanisms (2)
- Multilevel governance (2)
-
- Additionality (1)
- Climate change (1)
- Environmental econonomics (1)
- Executive power (1)
- Free trade (1)
- Innovation (1)
- Judicial Legitimacy (1)
- Kyoto protocol (1)
- Legal Realism (1)
- Public Opinion (1)
- Separation of powers (1)
- Take care clause (1)
- Thurman Arnold (1)
- Transaction costs (1)
- Unitary executive theory (1)
- Vesting clause (1)
Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Alternatives To Regulation?: Market Mechanisms And The Environment, David M. Driesen
Alternatives To Regulation?: Market Mechanisms And The Environment, David M. Driesen
College of Law - Faculty Scholarship
This book chapter presents a discussion of instrument choice in institutional context, with an emphasis on the Kyoto Protocol as an example of environmental benefit trading under a multilevel governance arrangement. Typically, economic models and qualitative discussion of instrument choice implicitly assume that a single regulator selects, designs, and enforces regulatory instruments. Increasingly, however, multiple polities implement regulatory instruments together. The Kyoto Protocol, for example, includes international, regional, national, sub-national, and private roles in the design and enforcement of emissions trading. This chapter emphasizes that design and enforcement are critical, as market mechanisms do not "automatically" produce environmental progress; rather …
Linkage And Multilevel Governance, David M. Driesen
Linkage And Multilevel Governance, David M. Driesen
College of Law - Faculty Scholarship
Economic models of emissions trading implicitly assume a simple unitary governance structure, where a single regulator designs and enforces an emissions trading program. The Kyoto Protocol, however, employs a multilevel governance structure in which international, regional, national, sub-national, and even private actors have significant roles in designing and enforcing the trading program. Under this structure, international trading of credits requires complex linking of disparate regional, national, and subnational trading program. This paper describes the multilevel governance model employed in the Kyoto Protocol and then analyzes some of the problems this complexity creates for the project of creating an international market …
An Environmental Competition Statute, David M. Driesen
An Environmental Competition Statute, David M. Driesen
College of Law - Faculty Scholarship
This chapter from a forthcoming Cambridge Press book, Beyond Environmental Law, proposes emulating free market dynamics with a new regulatory instrument, the Environmental Competition Statute. This statute would authorize any polluter making a pollution reduction to require a dirtier competitor to reimburse it for the full cost of making this improvement along with a preset profit margin. This creates an economic dynamic similar to that prevailing in very competitive markets. In such markets, those who innovate in effect take money from those who do not, by taking over a portion of their market share. This statute similarly allows environmental innovators …
Toward A Duty-Based Theory Of Executive Power, David M. Driesen
Toward A Duty-Based Theory Of Executive Power, David M. Driesen
College of Law - Faculty Scholarship
This article develops a duty-based theory of executive power. This theory maintains that the Constitution seeks to instill a duty in all executive branch officers to faithfully execute the law. Conversely, the Constitution's framers and ratifiers did not intend to empower the President to distinctively shape the law to suit his policy preferences or those of his party. Rather, they envisioned a model of "disinterested leadership" serving rule of law values. Because of the ratifiers' and framers' interest in preventing abuse of executive power the Constitution obligates executive branch officials to disobey illegal presidential directives and creates a major Congressional …
The Rule Of Law Is Dead! Long Live The Rule Of Law!, Keith J. Bybee
The Rule Of Law Is Dead! Long Live The Rule Of Law!, Keith J. Bybee
College of Law - Faculty Scholarship
Polls show that a significant proportion of the public considers judges to be political. This result holds whether Americans are asked about Supreme Court justices, federal judges, state judges, or judges in general. At the same time, a large majority of the public also believes that judges are fair and impartial arbiters, and this belief also applies across the board. In this paper, I consider what this half-law-half-politics understanding of the courts means for judicial legitimacy and the public confidence on which that legitimacy rests. Drawing on the Legal Realists, and particularly on the work of Thurman Arnold, I argue …