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Full-Text Articles in Law

Re-Writing The Statute Of Frauds: Part Performance In Equity, Willard T. Barbour Jan 1918

Re-Writing The Statute Of Frauds: Part Performance In Equity, Willard T. Barbour

Articles

One of the most striking examples of judicial legislation is that process whereby courts of equity, from the end of the seventeenth century onwards, have in no small measure re-written the Statute of Frauds. Exception was added to exception until the doctrine kmown as "part performance" became firmly established. The doctrine was not evolved consistently and the basis of some applications of it is obscure. One who follows Sir Edward Frys admirable but futile attempt (Fry, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (ed. 5) §§ 580, ff.) to systematize the variant decisions of the English courts must feel doubtful whether any single theory will …


The Patentability Of A Principle Of Nature, John B. Waite Jan 1917

The Patentability Of A Principle Of Nature, John B. Waite

Articles

The extent to which courts will go in conceding patentability to a natural law, or principle of nature, is evidenced in the case of Minerals Separation Co. v. Hyde, 37 Sup. Ct. -, decided by the Supreme Court, December 11, 1916. It has always been more or less an axiom of patent law that the discovery of a principle of nature does not entitle the discoverer to a patent for it. The case usually thought of first as authority therefor, is that of Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 5 Blatch. 116, 2 Fisher 320. The patentees in that case …


The Patentability Of A Mental Process, John B. Waite Jan 1917

The Patentability Of A Mental Process, John B. Waite

Articles

The fact of possession has been so correlated with the theory of property that it is difficult to dissociate ownership from the possibility of physical possession. One finds that the average lawyer, even though he may defind a right in rem as a right enforcible against any person, is extremely apt, unless after especial thought, to explain that it is enforcible against anyone because it pertains to a thing capable of physical possession and control, a thing that could be actually sequestered, from all other persons. Not at all infrequently the term property has been judicially stripped even of its …


Mortgagee In Possession In New York And Michigan, Edgar N. Durfee Jan 1916

Mortgagee In Possession In New York And Michigan, Edgar N. Durfee

Articles

It is interesting to observe how tenaciously the old common law of mortgages has persisted in the state of New York, the very cradle of the modem lien theory of the mortgage. As early as 1802 Chancellor KENT began the importation into that state of Lord MANSFIELD'S Civil Law doctrines of mortgage. Johnson v. Hart, 3 Johns. Cas. 322. In 1814, in the case of Runyan v. Mersereau, 11 Johns. 534, the lien theory definitely triumphed over the old law. In other cases, both before and since the statute of 1828 denying ejectment to the mortgagee, the details of mortgage …


Grantor's Remedy On Breach Of Condition Subsequent, James H. Brewster Jan 1908

Grantor's Remedy On Breach Of Condition Subsequent, James H. Brewster

Articles

In Mash v. Bloom (I9O7), - Wis. -, 114 N. W. Rep. 457, the court holds (Siebecker and Timlin, JJ., dissenting) that one, having conveyed real property subject to a condition subsequent, has no right of action to recover possession on breach of the condition until he has taken "advantage of condition broken and so notified the defendant, either by demand of possession or some other act equivalent to a re-entry for condition broken."


The Right Of A Bona Fide Occupant Of Land To Compensation For His Improvements, Henry W. Rogers Dec 1882

The Right Of A Bona Fide Occupant Of Land To Compensation For His Improvements, Henry W. Rogers

Articles

It may be observed, in the first place, that the civil law afforded protection to the bona fide occupant of land, who had made useful or permanent improvements on the land, believing himself to be the true owner. The civil law never permitted one who was in the possession of land in good faith, to be turned out of his possession by the rightful owner, without any compensation for the additional value he has given to the soil by the improvements he had made; but it allowed him to off-set the value of his improvements to the extent, at least, …