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Full-Text Articles in Law
Managerial Incentives To Repeatedly Collude: Frequency, Partners And Governance Rules, Catarina Marvao Dr., Chloé Le Coq
Managerial Incentives To Repeatedly Collude: Frequency, Partners And Governance Rules, Catarina Marvao Dr., Chloé Le Coq
Articles
Cartel recidivism has been discovered among many convicted firms and is often perceived as a result of the limited efficiency of competition policy. The incentives for managers to collude have been linked to the firm’s organizational structure, the corporate culture, and the type of executive compensation packages in place.
To the extent that undetected cartels differ from detected ones in relevant dimensions, the current empirical results on illegal cartels are biased. To tackle this issue, we use a novel dataset of a population of cartels, which were legal in Sweden up until 1993. We contribute to the current debate on …
Antitrust In Attention Markets: Objections And Responses, John M. Newman
Antitrust In Attention Markets: Objections And Responses, John M. Newman
Articles
The modern antitrust enterprise finds itself under attack. Critics complain that enforcement agencies have done nothing to stem an ever-rising tide of market concentration and corporate power. At the center of this critique lies Silicon Valley, home of a new generation of tech giants.
This symposium contribution contends that attention markets represent the largest sector of the modern economy to have gone unnoticed by antitrust regulators. If it is to fulfill its congressional mandate, the antitrust enterprise must begin paying attention to attention markets. A number of objections to this straightforward point have been raised, but each collapses under close …