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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Law
An Unsung Success Story: A Forty-Year Retrospective On U.S. Communications Policy, Christopher S. Yoo
An Unsung Success Story: A Forty-Year Retrospective On U.S. Communications Policy, Christopher S. Yoo
All Faculty Scholarship
Looking backwards on the occasion of Telecommunications Policy’s fortieth anniversary reveals just how far U.S. communications policy has come. All of the major challenges of 1976, such as promoting competition in customer premises equipment, long distance, and television networking, have largely been overcome. Moreover, new issues that emerged later, such as competition in local telephone service and multichannel video program distribution, have also largely been solved. More often than not, the solution has been the result of structural changes that enhanced facilities-based competition rather than agency-imposed behavioral requirements. Moreover, close inspection reveals that in most cases, prodding by the courts …
Antitrust Policy And Inequality Of Wealth, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust Policy And Inequality Of Wealth, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Why would anyone want to use antitrust law as a wealth distribution device when far more explicit statutory tools are available for that purpose? One feature of antitrust is its open-textured, nonspecific statutes that are interpreted by judges. As a result, using antitrust to redistribute wealth may be a way of invoking the judicial process without having to go to Congress or a state legislature that is likely to be unsympathetic. Of course, a corollary is that someone attempting to use antitrust law to redistribute wealth will have to rely on the existing antitrust statutes rather than obtaining a new …
The Ncaa And The Rule Of Reason, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Ncaa And The Rule Of Reason, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This brief essay considers the use of antitrust’s rule of reason in assessing challenges to rule making by the NCAA. In particular, it looks at the O’Bannon case, which involved challenges to NCAA rules limiting the compensation of student athletes under the NCAA rubric that protects the “amateur” status of collegiate athletes. Within that rubric, the Ninth Circuit got the right answer.
That outcome leads to a broader question, however: should the NCAA’s long held goal, frequently supported by the courts, of preserving athletic amateurism be jettisoned? Given the dual role that colleges play, that is a complex question, raising …
Restoring The Legitimacy Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis
Restoring The Legitimacy Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis
All Faculty Scholarship
This is a draft chapter from the American Antitrust Institute's 2017 recommendations to the 45th President of the United States. It contains a brief but well-deserved defense of the benefits of private antitrust enforcement and a critique of the claims that private enforcement in the United States is excessive, that it leads to overdeterrence, and that the courts are plagued with widespread frivolous antitrust lawsuits. It also offer a number of specific recommendations for the new administration to implement in the private antitrust enforcement area, including:
* Educate the courts, the public, and federal and state legislatures about the virtues …
Patent Pools And Related Technology Sharing, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Patent Pools And Related Technology Sharing, Erik Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
A patent "pool" is an arrangement under which patent holders in a common technology commit their patents to a single holder, who then licenses them out to the original patentees and perhaps also to outsiders. The payoffs include both revenue earned as a licensor, and technology acquired by pool members as licensees. Public effects can also be significant. For example, technology sharing of complementary patents can improve product quality and variety. In some information technology markets pools can prevent patents from becoming a costly obstacle to innovation by clearing channels of technology transfer. By contrast, a pool's aggregate output reduction …
Appraising Merger Efficiencies, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Appraising Merger Efficiencies, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
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Mergers of business firms violate the antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition, which generally refers to a price increase resulting from a reduction in output. However, a merger that threatens competition may also enable the post-merger firm to reduce its costs or improve its product. Attitudes toward mergers are heavily driven by assumptions about efficiency gains. If mergers of competitors never produced efficiency gains but simply reduced the number of competitors, a strong presumption against them would be warranted. We tolerate most mergers because of a background, highly generalized belief that most or at least many produce cost …
Buying Monopoly: Antitrust Limits On Damages For Externally Acquired Patents, Erik N. Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Buying Monopoly: Antitrust Limits On Damages For Externally Acquired Patents, Erik N. Hovenkamp, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The “monopoly” authorized by the Patent Act refers to the exclusionary power of individual patents. That is not the same thing as the acquisition of individual patent rights into portfolios that dominate a market, something that the Patent Act never justifies and that the antitrust laws rightfully prohibit.
Most patent assignments are procompetitive and serve to promote the efficient commercialization of patented inventions. However, patent acquisitions may also be used to combine substitute patents from external patentees, giving the acquirer an unearned monopoly position in the relevant technology market. A producer requires only one of the substitutes, but by acquiring …
Ex Parte Seizures Under The Dtsa And The Shift Of Ip Rights Enforcement, Yvette Joy Liebesman
Ex Parte Seizures Under The Dtsa And The Shift Of Ip Rights Enforcement, Yvette Joy Liebesman
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The ex parte seizure provision of the Defend Trade Secrets Act is another step in a long line of legislation that shifts the costs of private enforcement to the public, which already has a toehold in copyright and trademark law. The ex parte provision — which is not incorporated into any state trade secret law — relieves rights owners of two “burdens.” First, it relieves the trade secret owner of the burden of actually having to compete in the marketplace. Second, it relieves the trade secret owner of the burden of the costs associated with the discovery process of a …
Comment On “The Empirical Basis For Antitrust: Cartels, Mergers, And Remedies”, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
Comment On “The Empirical Basis For Antitrust: Cartels, Mergers, And Remedies”, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
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In this journal, James Langenfeld critically reviewed four of the present authors’ articles that analyze the size of cartel overcharges and their antitrust policy implications. In this comment, we explain why we believe Langenfeld errs in his criticism of our work. In particular, this comment discusses the variation in research quality of the sources used to compile a large sample of historical cartel overcharges; the advisability of trimming outliers or large estimates from the sample; alleged publication bias; why our 25% median estimate is much more likely to be correct than the US Sentencing Guideline’s 10% presumption; and the implications …