Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Antitrust and Trade Regulation (2)
- Comparative and Foreign Law (1)
- Criminal Law (1)
- Criminal Procedure (1)
- Economic Policy (1)
-
- Economic Theory (1)
- Economics (1)
- International Law (1)
- International Trade Law (1)
- Labor Economics (1)
- Labor and Employment Law (1)
- Law and Economics (1)
- Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation (1)
- Political Economy (1)
- Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration (1)
- Social and Behavioral Sciences (1)
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Neoclassical Labor Economics: Its Implications For Labor And Employment Law, Michael L. Wachter
Neoclassical Labor Economics: Its Implications For Labor And Employment Law, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
Whereas law and economics appears throughout business law, it never caught on in legal commentary about labor and employment law. A major reason is that the goals of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the country’s foundational labor law, are at war with basic principles of economics. The lack of integration is unfortunate if understandable. Notwithstanding the NLRA’s normative goal to keep wages out of competition, economic analysis applies as centrally to labor markets as to any other market.
One of the NLRA’s primary goals is to equalize bargaining power. Its drafters envisioned achieving this goal through procedural and substantive …
Price-Fixing: Hefty Penalties On Big-Biz Cartels Will Provide Level Playing Field To Small Businesses, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
Price-Fixing: Hefty Penalties On Big-Biz Cartels Will Provide Level Playing Field To Small Businesses, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
Cartels are illegal in India, as they are almost everywhere. They are subject to heavy fines. Why, then, do businesses frequently try to fix prices? Because doing so usually is profitable. On average cartels raise prices by more than 20%, and probably face less than a 25% chance of being caught and convicted. Based upon a sample of 75 international cartels, the authors calculate that the expected profits from price fixing almost always exceed the penalties. No wonder businesses often try to fix prices.
Introduction: Benefits Of Private Enforcement: Empirical Background, Robert H. Lande
Introduction: Benefits Of Private Enforcement: Empirical Background, Robert H. Lande
All Faculty Scholarship
This short piece takes a first step toward providing the empirical bases for an assessment of the benefits of private enforcement. It presents evidence showing that private enforcement of the antitrust laws is serving its intended purposes and is in the public interest. Private enforcement helps compensate victimized consumers, and it also helps deter anticompetitive conduct. This piece demonstrates this by briefly summarizing a more detailed analysis of forty of the largest recent successful private antitrust cases.
To analyze these cases' compensation effects this presents, inter alia, the amount of money each action recovered, what proportion of the money was …