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Full-Text Articles in Law
Reality Check On Officer Liability, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Reality Check On Officer Liability, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Scholarly Articles
This article addresses the fiduciary duties of corporate officers. Responding to a critique that recent scholarly analyses of officers depart from reality, it argues that, on a variety of grounds, those analyses are more realistic than the critique and provide doctrinal coherence and advance the goal of meaningful executive accountability. The divergent governance functions of directing versus managing are described and it is argued that those disparate roles should matter for fiduciary duty analysis. No great outbreak of litigation should be expected if officers are held to a stricter duty of care than directors because boards of directors, not courts, …
Counter-Narrative In Corporate Law: Saints And Sinners, Apostles And Epistles, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Counter-Narrative In Corporate Law: Saints And Sinners, Apostles And Epistles, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Scholarly Articles
Corporate law is bi-vocal. On the one hand, liberating and amoral statutes permit a master narrative of business persons eagerly pursuing the good life as they see it. The mixture of such lax law and human frailty frequently leads to the unleashing of boundless ambition, vanity, avarice, duplicity, and much mischief. On the other hand, another voice in corporate law occasionally moves into the foreground to interrupt and tell its own story – a counter-narrative demanding a measure of self-restraint – when those who direct or manage company affairs press self-gain (or sloth) to the point of intolerable excess. The …
Are Corporate Officers Advised About Fiduciary Duties, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Are Corporate Officers Advised About Fiduciary Duties, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Scholarly Articles
This Article reports the results of an empirical study of whether and how in-house corporate counsel advise corporate officers about fiduciary duties. The fiduciary duties of officers long have been neglected by courts, scholars, and lawyers, as the Introduction explains, even though executives play a central role in corporate success and failure. The study’s findings, organized by type of company (public or private), size, and attorney position within the firm, show several interesting patterns in advice-giving practices. For example, fewer than half of all respondents provided advice to officers below the senior-most rank. The results raise the possibility that, unlike …
(Not) Advising Corporate Officers About Fiduciary Duties, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Robert V. Ricca
(Not) Advising Corporate Officers About Fiduciary Duties, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Robert V. Ricca
Scholarly Articles
This Article explores the intersection of an important, unresolved corporate law issue and an overlooked professional responsibility issue persistently arising in the corporate milieu. The corporate law question currently unaddressed in Delaware law is whether the fiduciary duties of corporate officers, as agents, are the same as, or different from, the fiduciary duties of corporate directors. A related question is whether, in reviewing officer conduct, courts will apply the business judgment rule in the same broad (and protective) manner in which it is applied to assessing director behavior.
The professional responsibility issue concerns whether, and how well, lawyers are advising …
Having The Fiduciary Duty Talk: Model Advice For Corporate Officers (And Other Senior Agents), Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Having The Fiduciary Duty Talk: Model Advice For Corporate Officers (And Other Senior Agents), Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Scholarly Articles
Countless legal materials address the fiduciary duties of corporate directors. These include extensive decisional law, numerous institutes and continuing legal education seminars, several treatises and casebooks, and the well-known Corporate Director's Guidebook, recently released in its fifth edition. By contrast, legal materials on the fiduciary duties of corporate officers - key actors and agents in any company - are quite sparse. Case law is meager and undeveloped, with even such a baseline issue as the applicability of the business judgment rule lacking resolution. Treatises, institutes, and other legal materials frequently lump officer fiduciary duties with those of directors or treat …
The Audit Committee's Ethical And Legal Responsibilities: The State Law Perspective, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
The Audit Committee's Ethical And Legal Responsibilities: The State Law Perspective, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Scholarly Articles
This paper provides a state law perspective on the post-scandal, post-reform audit committee. Federal law, along with NYSE and Nasdaq (together, "SRO") rules, recently have made sweeping changes in corporate governance, including numerous provisions that bear on audit committees. These changes are unprecedented and dramatic, and rightly have received wide attention and careful study. Certain basic principles underlying the governance functions and duties of audit committees, however, originate in, and are still determined by, state law. Moreover, state law applies to all corporations; federal law and SRO rules on audit committees apply only to those companies coming under federal law …
Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon
Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon
Scholarly Articles
For all the recent federal attention to regulating - and differentiating - corporate officer and director functions, a curious fact remains: state fiduciary duty law makes no distinction between the fiduciary duties of these two groups. Instead, courts and commentators routinely describe the duties of directors and officers together, and in identical terms. To lump officers and directors together as generic fiduciaries with no distinction being made between them, suggests - as patently is not the case - that their institutional function and legal roles within the corporation are the same. Such a view, consequently, undermines efforts more sharply to …
After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse In Corporate Law, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse In Corporate Law, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Scholarly Articles
The demise of monetary damages as a remedy for breach of the corporate director duty of due care means that only a breach of the duty of loyalty or good faith affords the possibility of holding corporate directors personally liable for wrongdoing. The author argues that the fiduciary duty of loyalty contains both a widely appreciated, but rather minimal, "non-betrayal" aspect and a less appreciated, but more affirmative, "devotion" dimension. The affirmative. thrust of loyalty, grounded in widely-shared cultural norms and finding expression in myriad literary and religious stories, offers a doctrinal avenue for addressing a potentially broader range of …
The Social Responsibility Of Corporate Law Professors, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
The Social Responsibility Of Corporate Law Professors, Lyman P.Q. Johnson
Scholarly Articles
Most statements of corporate social responsibility focus on the responsibilities of corporate decision makers or their advisors Professor Johnson argues that corporate law professors-the persons who educate the students who will become lawyers counseling corporate decision makers-also have a social responsibility. He believes that professors should find various ways to raise the subject of corporate social responsibility in the basic corporations course, and he advocates rejecting a classroom approach that addresses only shareholder-manager relations After describing several possible ways to do this, Professor Johnson spotlights fiduciary laws as a fruitful area to enrich student understandings of director duties in a …