Law Commons^™

Value Creation By Business Lawyers: Where Are We And Where Are We Going?, Elizabeth Pollman

All Faculty Scholarship

This is a transcript of Professor Elizabeth Pollman’s remarks for the “Value Creation by Business Lawyers in the 21st Century” panel at the 2014 AALS Annual Meeting. The panel commemorated the 30th anniversary of Ronald Gilson’s article, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing. Professor Pollman’s remarks examined the influence of the Gilson article and potential areas for future work in light of regulatory and technological changes affecting transactional lawyering as well as the rise of in-house counsel.

The "Bad Man" Goes To Washington: The Effect Of Political Influence On Corporate Duty, Jill E. Fisch

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No abstract provided.

Is There A Role For Lawyers In Preventing Future Enrons?, Jill E. Fisch, Kenneth M. Rosen

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Following the collapse of the Enron Corporation, the ethical obligations of corporate attorneys have received increased scrutiny. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enacted in response to calls for corporate reform, specifically requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to address the lawyer’s role by requiring covered attorneys to “report up” evidence of corporate wrongdoing to key corporate officers, and, in some circumstances, to the board of directors. Failure to “report up” subjects a lawyer to liability under federal law.

This Article argues that the reporting up requirement reflects a second-best approach to corporate governance reform. Rather than focusing on the actors …

The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using The Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure The Board Of Directors, Jill E. Fisch, Caroline M. Gentile

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The Securities and Exchange Commission introduced a new corporate governance structure, the qualified legal compliance committee, as part of the professional standards of conduct for attorneys mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. QLCCs are consistent with the Commission’s general approach to improving corporate governance through specialized committees of independent directors. This Article suggests, however, that assessing the benefits and costs of creating QLCCs may be more complex than is initially apparent. Importantly, QLCCs are unlikely to be effective in the absence of incentives for active director monitoring. This Article concludes by considering three ways of increasing these incentives.

Aggregation, Auctions, And Other Developments In The Selection Of Lead Counsel Under The Pslra, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, And The Role Of The Plaintiff, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.