Law Commons^™

Capturing Regulatory Agendas?: An Empirical Study Of Industry Use Of Rulemaking Petitions, Daniel Walters

All Faculty Scholarship

A great deal of skepticism toward administrative agencies stems from the widespread perception that they excessively or even exclusively cater to business interests. From the political right comes the accusation that business interests use regulation to erect barriers to entry that protect profits and stifle competition. From the political left comes the claim that business interests use secretive interactions with agencies to erode and negate beneficial regulatory programs. Regulatory “capture” theory elevates many of these claims to the status of economic law. Despite growing skepticism about capture theory in academic circles, empirical studies of business influence and capture return ambiguous …

Teaching Voluntary Codes And Standards To Law Students, Cary Coglianese, Caroline Raschbaum

All Faculty Scholarship

Voluntary codes and standards issued by nongovernmental institutions affect many aspects of legal work and daily life. Although these codes and standards are voluntary—that is, they are not directly enforceable through civil or criminal penalties—they can and do often shape behavior. Codes and standards inform business practices and product designs. They affect the provisions of contracts and the licensing of patents. And, among still other uses, they affect the handling of evidence in criminal law matters.

More broadly, voluntary codes and standards can play a role similar to, or even take the place of, government regulations. Regulators regularly defer to …