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University of Missouri School of Law

Antitrust and Trade Regulation

Bundled discounts

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Law

Appropriate Liability Rules For Tying And Bundled Discounting, Thom Lambert Jan 2011

Appropriate Liability Rules For Tying And Bundled Discounting, Thom Lambert

Faculty Publications

This article asserts a comprehensive response to Elhauge’s provocative arguments. With respect to tying, the article shows that governing Supreme Court precedent does not deem the non-foreclosure “power” effects of the practice to be anticompetitive and that those effects are unlikely to reduce social welfare in the long run, especially after accounting for dynamic efficiencies. With respect to bundled discounting, the article shows that Elhauge’s proposed liability rule is both inapposite to consumer harm and inadministrable and that both “linked” market foreclosure and a form of below-cost pricing are necessary for anticompetitive harm and should therefore be prerequisites to antitrust …


Weyerhaeuser And The Search For Antitrust's Holy Grail, Thom Lambert Jan 2006

Weyerhaeuser And The Search For Antitrust's Holy Grail, Thom Lambert

Faculty Publications

A general definition of exclusionary conduct has become a sort of Holy Grail for antitrust scholars. At present, four proposed definitions appear most promising: (1) conduct that could exclude an equally efficient rival; (2) conduct that raises rivals' costs unjustifiably; (3) conduct that, on balance, impairs consumer welfare by creating market power without providing countervailing consumer benefits; and (4) conduct that makes no economic sense but for its exclusionary effect on rivals.