Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Corporations (2)
- Agency cost (1)
- Chinese Legal Scholarship (1)
- Corporate tax (1)
- Corporate valuation (1)
-
- Foreign income (1)
- Insider trading (1)
- Investment (1)
- Multinational enterprises (1)
- Residences (1)
- Shareholders (1)
- Soochow Law School (1)
- Stocks (1)
- Subsidiaries (1)
- Tax competition (1)
- Territoriality (1)
- Transfer pricing (1)
- University of Michigan Law School alumni (1)
- Wu (John C. H.) (1)
- Wu Jingxiong (1)
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
John C. H. Wu At The University Of Michigan School Of Law, Xiuqing Li
John C. H. Wu At The University Of Michigan School Of Law, Xiuqing Li
Articles
The following is an English language translation of a 2008 Chinese language article on John C.H. Wu, Soochow Law School LL.B. 1920 and Michigan Law School, J.D. 1921, by Professor Li Xiuqing of Shanghai's East China University of Political Science and Law. Li is a specialist in Chinese and foreign legal history, with a focus on the transplant of Western and Japanese law into China during the late imperial and modern era. She also serves as the Secretary-General of the China Foreign Legal History Association. In 2006-07, Li was a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Michigan Law School, where …
Back To The Future? The Potential Revival Of Territoriality, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Back To The Future? The Potential Revival Of Territoriality, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Articles
Since 1994, the trend in the United States and other developed countries appears to be to reduce the scope of residence jurisdiction and increase the emphasis on source jurisdiction. If this trend continues, these countries are likely to move toward territoriality and decrease the emphasis on their CFC rules. In the author’s opinion, the reason for this trend is political and economic, not legal. It is part of tax competition, specifically the competition to be the headquarters jurisdiction for multinationals. The author also thinks, however, that it is not necessary to go down this road because the solution to the …
Do Investors In Controlled Firms Value Insider Trading Laws? International Evidence, Laura Nyantung Beny
Do Investors In Controlled Firms Value Insider Trading Laws? International Evidence, Laura Nyantung Beny
Articles
This article characterizes insider trading as an agency problem in firms that have a controlling shareholder. Using a standard agency model of corporate value diversion through insider trading by the controlling shareholder, I derive testable hypotheses about the relationship between corporate value and insider trading laws among such firms. The article tests these hypotheses using firm-level cross-sectional data from twenty-seven developed countries. The results show that stringent insider trading laws and enforcement are associated with greater corporate valuation among the sample firms in common law countries, a result that is consistent with the claim that insider trading laws mitigate agency …