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Full-Text Articles in Law

For Haven's Sake: Reflections On Inversion Transactions, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah Jun 2002

For Haven's Sake: Reflections On Inversion Transactions, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Articles

This article discusses “inversion” transactions, in which a publicly traded U.S. corporation becomes a subsidiary of a newly established tax haven parent corporation. In the last three years, an increasing number of these transactions have been taking place, undeterred by the shareholderlevel tax imposed by the IRS on them in 1994. The article first discusses the reasons for the increasing popularity of the transactions and the tax goals they aim at achieving (primarily avoiding subpart F and U.S. earnings stripping). The article then discusses the tax policy implications of these transactions. In the short run, the article suggests that the …


Foreign Direct Investment In Latin America Overview And Current Status, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Martin B. Tittle Jan 2002

Foreign Direct Investment In Latin America Overview And Current Status, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Martin B. Tittle

Other Publications

More firms than ever, and in more industries and countries, are expanding abroad through [foreign] direct investment [FDI]. Although FDI in 1980 was equivalent to only 5% of world GDP, by the end of the 1990's, that percentage had more than tripled to 17%. In 1993, the total US dollar value of world FDI was only US$ 200 billion, but by the year 2000, it had risen to US$ 1.3 thousand billion. Developing countries received around 25% of these inflows, mostly in the form of "greenfield" investments, where a new enterprise is essentially created from scratch.


A Control-Based Approach To Shareholder Liability For Corporate Torts, Nina A. Mendelson Jan 2002

A Control-Based Approach To Shareholder Liability For Corporate Torts, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

Some commentators defend limited shareholder liability for torts and statutory violations as efficient, even though it encourages corporations to overinvest in and to externalize the costs of risky activity. Others propose pro rata unlimited shareholder liability for corporate torts. Both approaches, however, fail to account fully for qualitative differences among shareholders. Controlling shareholders, in particular, may have lower information costs, greater influence over managerial decisionmaking, and greater ability to benefit from corporate activity. This Article develops a control-based approach to shareholder liability. It first explores several differences among shareholders. For example, a controlling shareholder can more easily curb managerial risk …