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Series

University of Michigan Law School

Law & Economics Working Papers

2010

Antitrust

Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Law

Toward A Unified Theory Of Exclusionary Vertical Restraints, Daniel A. Crane, Graciela Miralles Oct 2010

Toward A Unified Theory Of Exclusionary Vertical Restraints, Daniel A. Crane, Graciela Miralles

Law & Economics Working Papers

The law of exclusionary vertical restraints—contractual or other business relationships between vertically related firms—is deeply confused and inconsistent in both the United States and the European Union. A variety of vertical practices including predatory pricing, tying, exclusive dealing, price discrimination, and bundling are treated very differently based on formalistic distinctions that bear no relationship to the practices’ exclusionary potential. We propose a comprehensive, unified test for all exclusionary vertical restraints that centers on two factors, foreclosure and substantiality. We then assign economic content to these factors. A restraint forecloses if it denies equally efficient rivals a reasonable opportunity to make …


Predation Analysis And The Ftc’S Case Against Intel, Daniel A. Crane May 2010

Predation Analysis And The Ftc’S Case Against Intel, Daniel A. Crane

Law & Economics Working Papers

The Federal Trade Commission's pending antitrust case against Intel challenges a number of Intel's discounting and rebating practices. The Commission appears poised to apply a cost-price test to the challenged practices, but proposes to include "fixed sunk costs" in the appropriate measure of cost. This paper explains the importance of using cost-price screens to assess unilaterally imposed prices and analyzes the futility of including sunk costs in the relevant cost measure.


Did We Avoid Historical Failures Of Antitrust Enforcement During The 2008-09 Financial Crisis?, Daniel A. Crane Feb 2010

Did We Avoid Historical Failures Of Antitrust Enforcement During The 2008-09 Financial Crisis?, Daniel A. Crane

Law & Economics Working Papers

This introductory essay for a symposium on antitrust enforcement during economic crises provides a brief historical overview of the failures of antitrust enforcement during major economic crises and wars in the first half of the twentieth century. It then considers the reasons that historical narrative breaks off in the second half of the twentieth century and asks whether there is evidence of its revival during the recent economic crisis.


Reflections On Section 5 Of The Ftc Act And The Ftc’S Case Against Intel, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2010

Reflections On Section 5 Of The Ftc Act And The Ftc’S Case Against Intel, Daniel A. Crane

Law & Economics Working Papers

This paper explores the policy implications of the FTC's decision to file its enforcement action against Intel under Section 5 of the FTC Act and declare that it has the power to go further under Section 5's "unfair competition" prong than it could under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. It argues that Intel is an inappropriate case for the Commission to make a bid for Section 5 independence since none of the Commission's institutional advantages over Article III courts justifies a departure from ordinary Section 2 norms in this case. Indeed, the Intel case has the potential to set …