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Federal Guilty Pleas: Inequities, Indigence And The Rule 11 Process, Julian A. Cook Jan 2019

Federal Guilty Pleas: Inequities, Indigence And The Rule 11 Process, Julian A. Cook

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In 2017 and 2018, the Supreme Court issued two little-noticed decisions—Lee v. United States and Class v. United States. While neither case captured the attention of the national media nor generated meaningful academic commentary, both cases are well deserving of critical examination for reasons independent of the issues presented to the Court. They deserve review because of a consequential shared fact; a fact representative of a commonplace, yet largely overlooked, federal court practice that routinely disadvantages the indigent (and disproportionately minority populations), and compromises the integrity of arguably the most consequential component of the federal criminal justice process. In each …


Some Kind Of Hearing Officer, Kent H. Barnett Jan 2019

Some Kind Of Hearing Officer, Kent H. Barnett

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In his prominent 1975 law-review article, “Some Kind of Hearing,” Second Circuit Judge Henry Friendly explored how courts (and agencies) should respond when the Due Process Clause required, in the Supreme Court’s exceedingly vague words, “some kind of hearing.” That phrase led to the familiar (if unhelpful) Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, in which courts weigh three factors to determine how much process or formality is due. But the Supreme Court has never applied Mathews to another, often ignored facet of due process—the requirement for impartial adjudicators. As it turns out, Congress and agencies have broad discretion to fashion not …


Constructing The Original Scope Of Constitutional Rights, Nathan Chapman Jan 2019

Constructing The Original Scope Of Constitutional Rights, Nathan Chapman

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In this solicited response to Ingrid Wuerth's "The Due Process and Other Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations," I explain and justify Wuerth's methodology for constructing the original scope of constitutional rights. The original understanding of the Constitution, based on text and historical context, is a universally acknowledged part of constitutional law today. The original scope of constitutional rights — who was entitled to them, where they extended, and so on — is a particularly difficult question that requires a measure of construction based on the entire historical context. Wuerth rightly proceeds one right at a time with a careful consideration …