Law Commons^™

Hearsay And The Confrontation Clause, Lynn Mclain

All Faculty Scholarship

This speech was delivered to the Wicomico Co. Bar Association on October 28th, 2016. It is an updated version of the 2012 speech, available at http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac/924/ .

Overview: Only an out-of-court statement ("OCS") offered for the truth of the matter that was being asserted by the out-of-court declarant ("declarant") at the time when s/he made the OCS ("TOMA") = hearsay ("HS"). If evidence is not HS, the HS rule cannot exclude it. The Confrontation Clause also applies only to HS, but even then, only to its subcategory comprising "testimonial hearsay." Cross-references to "MD-EV" are to section numbers of L. MCLAIN, …

Interpretation: Article I, Section 5, Ronald Weich, Martin B. Gold

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In Article I of the Constitution, the Framers vest the legislative authority of the United States government in a bicameral Congress, and over the ten sections of the Article they systematically flesh out the structure, duties, and powers of that Congress. In the early sections of Article I they describe the membership of each House, giving life to the “Great Compromise” of the Constitutional Convention under which each state has equal representation in the Senate but population-based representation in the House of Representatives. In Section 5, they grant Congress the power to govern itself.

Section 5 consists of four separate …

Taking Patents, Gregory Dolin, Irina D. Manta

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The America Invents Act (AIA) was widely hailed as a remedy to the excessive number of patents that the Patent & Trademark Office issued, and especially ones that would later turn out to be invalid. In its efforts to eradicate “patent trolls” and fend off other ills, however, the AIA introduced serious constitutional problems that this Article brings to the fore. We argue that the AIA’s new “second-look” mechanisms in the form of Inter Partes Review (IPR) and Covered Business Method Review (CBMR) have greatly altered the scope of vested patent rights by modifying the boundaries of existing patents. The …

Defining Lawmaking Power, Kimberly L. Wehle

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This Article teases apart the various permutations of what the federal lawmaking power means, canvases the Court's historical treatment of that question, and describes its practical implications as a matter of both constitutional and administrative law. It proposes a taxonomy of lawmaking in an effort to bring coherence to the task of defining the lawmaking power as well as Congress's prerogative to exercise it.

Congressional And Presidential War Powers As A Dialogue: Analysis Of The Syrian And Isis Conflicts, Charles Tiefer, Kathleen Clark

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Much of the scholarship on war powers looks back on whether U.S. military interventions were authorized, examining the President's powers under Article II of the Constitution, and congressional enactments. That legal question is important, but it does not capture the interactive nature of the dynamic between Congress and the President. This Article instead focuses on the process of dialogue between Congress and the President prior to the exercise of war powers. We examine in detail how that dialogue operates in two recent episodes: the U.S. response to Syrian President Assad's use of chemical weapons in 2013, and the rise of …

Constitutional Law And Rhetoric, Colin Starger

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What are the legitimate types of argument in constitutional debate? This is a perennial question in American law and every generation of constitutional scholars has the right to ask it anew. For over thirty years, Phillip Bobbitt’s taxonomy of legitimate constitutional argument types has reigned as the most influential and enduring in the scholarly discourse. In a recent article, Jamal Greene has proposed a welcome but flawed rhetorical re-conception of Bobbitt’s venerable typology. By identifying and correcting the errors in Greene’s framework, this Article provides a rigorous theoretical grounding for the entire constitutional law and rhetoric project.

When properly grounded, …

Whither Reasonable Suspicion: The Supreme Court's Functional Abandonment Of The Reasonableness Requirement For Fourth Amendment Seizures, Steven P. Grossman

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Although the United States Supreme Court’s approach to issues governing application of the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment has mutated over the years, at least one aspect of its approach has remained constant. Before information leading to probable cause or its lesser iteration of reasonable suspicion is found to exist, the government must demonstrate in some meaningful way the reliability of the person providing the information or of the information itself. Lacking such reliability, no search or seizure based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion is permitted. In its recent decision in Navarette v. California, the Court largely …

The Inequality Of America's Death Penalty: A Crossroads For Capital Punishment At The Intersection Of The Eighth And Fourteenth Amendments, John Bessler

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We live in a divided society, from gated communities to cell blocks congested with disproportionate numbers of young African-American men. There are rich and poor, privileged and homeless, Democrats and Republicans, wealthy zip codes and stubbornly impoverished ones. There are committed "Black Lives Matter" protesters, and there are those who—invoking "Blue Lives Matter" demonstrate in support of America‘s hardworking police officers. In her new article, "Matters of Strata: Race, Gender, and Class Structures in Capital Cases," George Washington University law professor Phyllis Goldfarb highlights the stratification of our society and offers a compelling critique of America‘s death penalty regime—one, she …