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Mississippi College School of Law

Religious pluralism

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Beyond Theocracy And Secularism (Part I): Toward A New Paradigm For Law And Religion, Mark C. Modak-Truran Jan 2007

Beyond Theocracy And Secularism (Part I): Toward A New Paradigm For Law And Religion, Mark C. Modak-Truran

Journal Articles

As part of a larger project challenging and moving beyond the premodern and modern paradigms, this article focuses on the modern paradigm and its notion of secularization. Section II will discuss the origin of the modern paradigm as a reaction to the religious pluralism and the religious wars in the sixteenth and seventeenth century such as the Thirty Years War in Europe (1618-48) and the English Civil War (1642-51) resulting from the Protestant Reformation. The Reformation divided the Western part of the Christian tradition into separate confessional institutions based on different theological interpretations of Christianity such as Lutheran, Calvinist, and …


Symposium Introduction, Mark C. Modak-Truran Jan 2007

Symposium Introduction, Mark C. Modak-Truran

Journal Articles

The articles and essays in this Symposium should greatly aid disclosing key presuppositions of religionists and secularists by thinking about the law (rather than through the law) and by employing other disciplinary perspectives and methods to provide a more sophisticated understanding of law and religion. I will provide a brief summary of each article and essay and indicate the methods or disciplinary perspectives employed by them in their analysis.


Reenchanting The Law: The Religious Dimension Of Judicial Decision Making, Mark C. Modak-Truran Jan 2004

Reenchanting The Law: The Religious Dimension Of Judicial Decision Making, Mark C. Modak-Truran

Journal Articles

Without a religious justification in the law, judges cannot fully justify their decisions in hard cases from within the law. The law must be indeterminate because the Establishment Clause proscribes this full justification. This does not mean that the Establishment Clause prohibits judges from fully justifying their decisions during their deliberations about hard cases. It only prohibits judges from including that full justification in their written opinions. Deliberation and explanation are separate stages of judicial decision making that should be kept distinct. Given this distinction, my thesis is that judges should fully justify their decisions in hard cases by relying …