Law Commons^™

Patent Trial And Appeal Board's Consistency-Enhancing Function, Michael D. Frakes, Melissa F. Wasserman

Faculty Scholarship

Agency heads, who have the primary responsibility for setting an agency's policy preferences, have a variety of tools by which they attempt to minimize the discretion of their staff officials in an effort to ensure agency policy preferences are consistently applied. One such mechanism is subjecting agency official's determinations to higher-level agency review. While scholars have long surmised that judges seek to minimize reversal of their decisions by a higher-level court, how agency officials' decisions are influenced by higher-level agency reconsideration has mostly eluded analysis.

In this Essay, we begin to fill this gap by examining the extent to which …

Irrational Ignorance At The Patent Office, Michael D. Frakes, Melissa F. Wasserman

Faculty Scholarship

There is widespread belief that the Patent Office issues too many bad patents that impose significant harms on society. At first glance, the solution to the patent quality crisis seems straightforward: give patent examiners more time to review applications so they grant patents only to those inventions that deserve them. Yet the answer to the harms of invalid patents may not be that easy. It is possible that the Patent Office is, as Mark Lemley famously wrote, “rationally ignorant.” In Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, Lemley argued that because so few patents are economically significant, it makes sense to …

Is The Time Allocated To Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners To Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence From Micro-Level Application Data, Michael D. Frakes, Melissa F. Wasserman

Faculty Scholarship

We explore how examiner behavior is altered by the time allocated for reviewing patent applications. Insufficient examination time may hamper examiner search and rejection efforts, leaving examiners more inclined to grant invalid applications. To test this prediction, we use application-level data to trace the behavior of individual examiners over the course of a series of promotions that carry with them reductions in examination-time allocations. We find evidence demonstrating that such promotions are associated with reductions in examination scrutiny and increases in granting tendencies, as well as evidence that those additional patents being issued on the margin are of below-average quality.

Procrastination In The Workplace: Evidence From The U.S. Patent Office, Michael D. Frakes, Melissa F. Wasserman

Faculty Scholarship

Despite much theoretical attention to the concept of procrastination and much exploration of this phenomenon in laboratory settings, there remain few empirical investigations into the practice of procrastination in real world contexts, especially in the workplace. In this paper, we attempt to fill these gaps by exploring procrastination among U.S. patent examiners. We find that nearly half of examiners’ first substantive reports are completed immediately prior to the operable deadlines. Moreover, we find a range of additional empirical markers to support that this “end-loading” of reviews results from a model of procrastination rather than various alternative time-consistent models of behavior. …

Empirical Scholarship On The Prosecution Process At The Pto, Michael D. Frakes, Melissa F. Wasserman

Faculty Scholarship

In this book chapter, we summarize empirical scholarship examining the patent prosecution process at the United States Patent and Trademark Office.

Does The U.S. Patent And Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence From A Quasi-Experiment, Michael D. Frakes, Melissa F. Wasserman

Faculty Scholarship

Many believe the root cause of the patent system’s dysfunction is that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO or Agency) is issuing too many invalid patents that unnecessarily drain consumer welfare. Concerns regarding the Agency’s overgranting tendencies have recently spurred the Supreme Court to take a renewed interest in substantive patent law and have driven Congress to enact the first major patent reform act in over sixty years. Policymakers, however, have been modifying the system in an effort to increase patent quality in the dark. As there exists little to no compelling empirical evidence the PTO is actually overgranting …

The Failed Promise Of User Fees: Empirical Evidence From The United States Patent And Trademark Office, Michael D. Frakes, Melissa F. Wasserman

Faculty Scholarship

In an attempt to shed light on the impact of user-fee financing structures on the behavior of administrative agencies, we explore the relationship between the funding structure of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and its examination practices. We suggest that the PTO’s reliance on prior grantees to subsidize current applicants exposes the Agency to a risk that its obligatory costs will surpass incoming fee collections. When such risks materialize, we hypothesize, and thereafter document, that the PTO will restore financial balance by extending preferential examination treatment—i.e., higher granting propensities and/or shorter wait times—to some technologies over others.

Does Agency Funding Affect Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment Of The Pto’S Granting Patterns, Michael D. Frakes, Melissa F. Wasserman

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Improving (Software) Patent Quality Through The Administrative Process, Arti K. Rai

Faculty Scholarship

The available evidence indicates that patent quality, particularly in the area of software, needs improvement. This Article argues that even an agency as institutionally constrained as the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) could implement a portfolio of pragmatic, cost-effective quality improvement strategies. The argument in favor of these strategies draws upon not only legal theory and doctrine but also new data from a PTO software examination unit with relatively strict practices. Strategies that resolve around Section 112 of the patent statute could usefully be deployed at the initial examination stage. Other strategies could be deployed within the new post-issuance …

Who’S Afraid Of The Federal Circuit?, Arti K. Rai

Faculty Scholarship

In this brief Essay, Professor Rai responds to Professor Jonathan Masur's Yale Law Journal article "Patent Inflation." Professor Masur's argument rests on the assumption that U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") behavior is determined almost entirely by a desire to avoid reversal by the Federal Circuit. Although the PTO is certainly a weak agency over which the Federal Circuit has considerable power, Masur overestimates the extent to which high-level PTO administrators are concerned about Federal Circuit reversals and underestimates institutional influences that are likely to operate in a deflationary direction. The PTO is influenced not only by the Federal Circuit …

Growing Pains In The Administrative State: The Patent Office’S Troubled Quest For Managerial Control, Arti K. Rai

Faculty Scholarship

In the last ten years, the workload of the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") has increased dramatically. Complaints about the PTO's ability to manage its workload have increased in tandem. Interestingly, although Congress has explicitly given the PTO rulemaking authority over the processing of patent applications, and withheld from it authority over "substantive" patent law, the PTO has arguably enjoyed more success in influencing substantive law than in executing direct efforts to manage its workload. This Article explores the multiple, mutually reinforcing reasons for this anomaly. It argues that although there are good reasons to be frustrated with the PTO's …