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Columbia Law School

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Fragmentation Nodes: A Study In Financial Innovation, Complexity, And Systemic Risk, Kathryn Judge Jan 2012

Fragmentation Nodes: A Study In Financial Innovation, Complexity, And Systemic Risk, Kathryn Judge

Faculty Scholarship

This Article resents a case study in how complexity arising from the evolution and proliferation of a financial innovation can increase systemic risk. The subject of the case study is the securitization of home loans, an innovation which played a critical and still not fully understood role in the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The Article introduces the term "fragmentation node" for these transaction structures, and it shows how specific sources of complexity inherent in fragmentation nodes limited transparency and flexibility in ways that undermined the stability of the financial system. In addition to shedding new light on the processes through which …


Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers, Merritt B. Fox Jan 2012

Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

This Article addresses the fundamental question of whether, as a matter of good policy, it is ever appropriate that a foreign issuer be subject to the U.S. fraud-on-the-market private damages class action liability regime, and, if so, by what kinds of claimants and under what circumstances. The bulk of payouts under the U.S. securities laws arise out of fraud-on-the-market class actions – actions against issuers on behalf of secondary market purchasers of their shares for trading losses suffered as a result of issuer misstatements in violation of Rule 10b-5. In the first decade of this century, foreign issuers became frequent …


Regulatory Dualism As A Development Strategy: Corporate Reform In Brazil, The United States, And The European Union, Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmaan, Mariana Pargendler Jan 2011

Regulatory Dualism As A Development Strategy: Corporate Reform In Brazil, The United States, And The European Union, Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmaan, Mariana Pargendler

Faculty Scholarship

Countries pursuing economic development confront afundamental obstacle. Reforms that increase the size of the overall pie are blocked by powerful interests that are threatened by the growth-inducing changes. This problem is conspicuous in efforts to create effective capital markets to support economic development. Controlling owners and managers of established firms successfully oppose corporate governance reforms that would improve investor protection and promote capital market growth. In this Article, we examine the promise of regulatory dualism as a strategy to defuse the tension between future growth and the current distribution of wealth and power. Regulatory dualism seeks to mitigate political opposition …


The Law, Culture, And Economics Of Fashion, C. Scott Hemphill, Jeannie Suk Jan 2009

The Law, Culture, And Economics Of Fashion, C. Scott Hemphill, Jeannie Suk

Center for Contract and Economic Organization

Fashion is one of the world’s most important creative industries. It is the major output of a global business with annual U.S. sales of more than $200 billion — larger than those of books, movies, and music combined. Everyone wears clothing and inevitably participates in fashion to some degree. Fashion is also a subject of periodically rediscovered fascination in virtually all the social sciences and the humanities. It has provided economic thought with a canonical example in theorizing about consumption and conformity. Social thinkers have long treated fashion as a window upon social class and social change. Cultural theorists have …


Controlling Family Shareholders In Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange, Ronald J. Gilson Jan 2007

Controlling Family Shareholders In Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, corporate governance scholarship has begun to focus on the most common distribution of public corporation ownership: outside of the United States and the United Kingdom, publicly owned corporations often have a controlling shareholder. The presence of a controlling shareholder is especially prevalent in developing countries. In Asia, for example, some two-thirds of public corporations have one, most of whom represent family ownership. The law and finance literature, exemplified by a series of articles by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny and others, treats the prevalence of controlling shareholders as the result of bad law; …


Engineering A Venture Capital Market: Lessons From The American Experience, Ronald J. Gilson Jan 2003

Engineering A Venture Capital Market: Lessons From The American Experience, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

The venture capital market and firms whose creation and early stages were financed by venture capital are among the crown jewels of the American economy. Beyond representing an important engine of macroeconomic growth and job creation, these firms have been a major force in commercializing cutting-edge science, whether through their impact on existing industries as with the radical changes in pharmaceuticals catalyzed by venture-backed firms' commercialization of biotechnology, or by their role in developing entirely new industries as with the emergence of the Internet and World Wide Web. The venture capital market thus provides a unique link between finance and …


Careers And Contingency, Gillian Lester Jan 1998

Careers And Contingency, Gillian Lester

Faculty Scholarship

Disagreement among legal scholars over the phenomenon of "contingent employment" – work having limited hours, duration, or security – has led to disparate prescriptions for legal reform. For some, the best solution would be to either leave the market alone, or eliminate existing regulations that drive employers to create contingent jobs. Others believe current regulations do not go far enough and advocate reforms ranging from expanding mandatory benefits and protections to facilitating collective bargaining among contingent workers in order to restore such benefits as long-term security, training, and career advancement. The debate about law reform has centered partly on disputes …


The Local Government Boundary Problem In Metropolitan Areas, Richard Briffault Jan 1996

The Local Government Boundary Problem In Metropolitan Areas, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

Local government boundaries play an important role in the governance of metropolitan areas by defining local electorates and tax bases and the scope of local regulatory powers and service responsibilities. Yet, the close association of local powers with local boundaries generates spillovers, fiscal disparities, and interlocal conflicts. Real local autonomy is constrained but the local government system fails to provide a means for addressing regional problems. Public choice theorists and political decentralizationists oppose regional governments because of the threat to local autonomy that would result from removing powers from local hands. Richard Briffault's solution to the metropolitan governance problem is …


Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, And The Liquidated Damages Rule, Eric L. Talley Jan 1994

Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, And The Liquidated Damages Rule, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

The common law practice of refusing to enforce contractual penalties has long mystified law and economics scholars. After critiquing the prevailing law and economics analyses of the common law rule, Eric L. Talley reevaluates the penalty doctrine using the game theoretic technique of mechanism design, which facilitates the analysis of multiparty bargaining situations under various assumptions. Using this technique to model the allocational consequences of various enforcement regimes that courts might adopt with respect to stipulated damages clauses, Mr. Talley finds that penalty nonenforcement can increase economic efficiency by discouraging strategic behavior by the parties, thereby inducing more efficient contract …


Measuring Sellers' Damages: The Lost-Profits Puzzle, Charles J. Goetz, Robert E. Scott Jan 1979

Measuring Sellers' Damages: The Lost-Profits Puzzle, Charles J. Goetz, Robert E. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

A buyer repudiates a fixed-price contract to purchase goods, and the seller sues for damages. How should a court measure the seller's loss? The answer seems simple: The seller should be awarded damages sufficient to place it in the same economic position it would have enjoyed had the buyer performed the contract. But the seductive conceptual simplicity of the compensation principle disguises substantial practical problems in measuring seller's damages.

Contract law has traditionally minimized measurement difficulties by basing damages in most cases on the difference between the contract price and market value of the repudiated goods. The common law courts …