Law Commons^™

Gatekeeper Failures: Why Important, What To Do, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

The United States was hit by a wave of corporate scandals that crested between late 2001 and the end of 2002. Some were traditional scandals involving insiders looting company assets – the most prominent being Tyco, HealthSouth, and Adelphia. But most were what might be called "financial scandals": attempts by an issuer to maximize the market price of its securities by creating misimpressions as to what its future cash flows were likely to be. Enron and WorldCom were the most spectacular examples of these financial scandals. In scores of additional cases, the companies involved and their executives were sued by …

The Role Of Letters Of Credit In Payment Transactions, Ronald J. Mann

Faculty Scholarship

Common justifications for the use of the letter of credit fail to explain its widespread use. The classic explanation claims that the letter of credit provides an effective assurance of payment from a financially responsible third party. In that story, the seller – a Taiwanese clothing manufacturer, for example – fears that the overseas buyer – Wal-Mart – will refuse to pay once the goods have been shipped. Cross-border transactions magnify the concern, because the difficulties of litigating in a distant forum will hinder the manufacturer's efforts to force the distant buyer to pay. The manufacturer-seller solves that problem by …

The Folklore Of Investor Capitalism, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Ideally, Thurman Arnold should review this book. In his The Folklore of American Capitalism, Arnold dissected the ideology and rationalizations by which the business community of an earlier day defended its legitimacy and perquisites. Michael Useem, a sociologist at the Wharton School, also has an interest in the ideology of the business community: how corporate managers view the new institutional investors, how they justify resistance, and the tensions and inconsistencies between their critiques of money managers and their own behavior. This is an underutilized perspective (which law and economics inherently tends to overlook), and Useem is at his best …

Positivism And The Separation Of Law And Economics, Avery W. Katz

Faculty Scholarship

The modem field of law and economics – that is, the application of economic analysis to legal subjects other than trade and business regulation – is now over thirty years old, but it remains controversial in the legal academy and, to a lesser extent, in the profession at large. Since its beginnings in the early 1960s, the economic approach has provoked substantial opposition and antagonism. The sources of this resistance, however, are a matter of dispute. Many economists and economically influenced lawyers attribute it to more traditional lawyers' reluctance to learn a new and unfamiliar set of concepts and techniques. …

Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, John C. Coffee Jr., Bernard S. Black

Faculty Scholarship

A central puzzle in understanding the governance of large American public firms is why most institutional shareholders are passive. Why would they rather sell than fight? Until recently, the Berle-Means paradigm – the belief that separation of ownership and control naturally characterizes the modern corporation – reigned supreme. Shareholder passivity was seen as an inevitable result of the scale of modern industrial enterprise and of the collective action problems that face shareholders, each of whom owns only a small fraction of a large firm's shares.

A paradigm shift may be in the making, however. Rival hypotheses have recently been offered …

Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory Of Section 16(B), Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

Part I of this article assesses the social costs of a crude rule of thumb. Because section 16(b) applies to a given class of paired transactions, it deters both transactions based on inside information and transactions not so based. Each time section 16(b) is stretched to include a class of paired transactions, it deters some additional innocent transactions. This side effect will take the form of officers' and directors' purchasing fewer shares in their own companies and refusing to accept as large a portion of their compensation in a form based on share price. There are strong theoretical and empirical …

Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain In The Corporate Web, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

"We have entered the era of the two-tier, front-end loaded, bootstrap, bust-up, junk-bond takeover." —Martin Lipton

Until recently, takeovers typically involved larger firms digesting smaller firms, a process that most theorists have assumed was driven by the pursuit of synergistic gains. Lately, however, this dynamic has dramatically reversed itself. To a considerable extent, the large conglomerate is now the target, and such prototypical conglomerate firms as General Foods, Richardson-Vicks, Beatrice, Revlon, SCM, CBS,USX, and Anderson, Clayton and Co. have either been acquired or forced to restructure themselves within the last three years alone. The new bidder in turn tends to …