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Series

Columbia Law School

Contracts

Contracts

2004

Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Law

Contracts With Consent: A Contextual Critique Of The No-Retraction Liability Regime, Ronald J. Mann Jan 2004

Contracts With Consent: A Contextual Critique Of The No-Retraction Liability Regime, Ronald J. Mann

Faculty Scholarship

This is a reply to Omri Ben-Shahar's Contracts with Consent, forthcoming in the Pennsylvania Law Review, and will be published along with his essay in that journal. The reply makes two main points. First, it argues that Omri's no-retraction liability regime will impose substantial costs, largely because of the frequency with which parties will have non-opportunistic reasons for retracting contract proposals that their negotiating partners have not yet accepted. Second, it argues that these costs will be substantial even though Ben-Shahar presents his proposal as a default rule. First, his rule vitiates the information-forcing benefits of the current ...


Self-Enforcing International Agreements And The Limits Of Coercion, Robert E. Scott, Paul B. Stephan Jan 2004

Self-Enforcing International Agreements And The Limits Of Coercion, Robert E. Scott, Paul B. Stephan

Faculty Scholarship

International law provides an ideal context for studying the effects of freedom from coercion on cooperative behavior. To be sure, almost all academic discussions on the subject begin by asking whether international law constitutes "law." But the category of all "international law" is too big and heterogeneous to permit useful analysis. Whether to regard, say, the rules governing the conduct of war or international humanitarian law as "law" presents radically different issues than analyzing the legal character of the Treaty of Rome (the constitutive instrument of the European Community), or the Warsaw Convention (the instrument governing contracts for the carriage ...


Self-Enforcing International Agreements And The Limits Of Coercion, Robert E. Scott, Paul B. Stephan Jan 2004

Self-Enforcing International Agreements And The Limits Of Coercion, Robert E. Scott, Paul B. Stephan

Faculty Scholarship

International law provides an ideal context for studying the effects of freedom from coercion on cooperative behavior. Framers of international agreements, no less than the authors of private contracts, can choose between self enforcement and coercive third-party mechanisms to induce compliance with the commitments they make. Studies of individual contracting provide some evidence that coercive sanctions may crowd out self enforcement, implying that too great a propensity by external actors to intervene in the contractual relationship may produce welfare losses. We explore the possibility that too much coercive third-party enforcement similarly can reduce the value of international agreements.

We argue ...


Embedded Options In The Case Against Compensation In Contract Law, Robert E. Scott, George G. Triantis Jan 2004

Embedded Options In The Case Against Compensation In Contract Law, Robert E. Scott, George G. Triantis

Faculty Scholarship

Although compensation is the governing principle in contract law remedies, it has tenuous historical, economic, and empirical support. A promisor's right to breach and pay damages is only a subset of a larger family of termination rights that do not purport to compensate the promisee for losses suffered when the promisor walks away from the contemplated exchange. These termination rights can be characterized as embedded options that serve important risk management functions. We show that sellers often sell insurance to their buyers in the form of these embedded call options, and that termination fees, including damages, are in essence ...