Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
One (Firm) Is Not Enough: A Legal-Economic Analysis Of Ec-Fasteners, Chad P. Brown, Petros C. Mavroidis
One (Firm) Is Not Enough: A Legal-Economic Analysis Of Ec-Fasteners, Chad P. Brown, Petros C. Mavroidis
Faculty Scholarship
The WTO’s Appellate Body (AB) dealt with a number of issues for the first time in the Report of EC-Fasteners. Importantly, the AB discussed the consistency of the European Union (EU) regulation with the multilateral rules on the conditions for deviating from the obligation to calculate individual dumping margins. Although China formally won the argument, the AB may have opened the door to treat China as a non-market economy (NME) even beyond 2016 when China’s NME-status was thought to expire under the terms of China’s 2001 WTO Accession Protocol. The AB further dealt with numerous other issues ranging from statistical …
The Byrd Amendment Is Wto-Illegal: But We Must Kill The Byrd With The Right Stone, Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Petros C. Mavroidis
The Byrd Amendment Is Wto-Illegal: But We Must Kill The Byrd With The Right Stone, Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Petros C. Mavroidis
Faculty Scholarship
On 16 January 2003, the WTO Appellate Body issued its report on United States – Continued Dumping And Subsidy Offset Act Of 2000 (WTO Doc. WT/DS217 and 234/AB/R). In this report, the Appellate Body condemned the so-called US Byrd Amendment by finding that it was inconsistent with the US obligations under the WTO Agreements on Antidumping (AD) and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM).
The World Trade Organization's Agreement On Government Procurement: Expanding Disciplines, Declining Membership?, Bernard Hoekman, Petros C. Mavroidis
The World Trade Organization's Agreement On Government Procurement: Expanding Disciplines, Declining Membership?, Bernard Hoekman, Petros C. Mavroidis
Faculty Scholarship
The Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) – originally negotiated during the Tokyo Round – was renegotiated for the second time during the Uruguay Round. It is one of the WTO's so-called Plurilateral Agreements, in that its disciplines apply only to those WTO Members that have signed it. In contrast to most of the other Tokyo Round codes – e.g., the agreements on technical barriers to trade (standards), import licensing, customs valuation, subsidies, and antidumping – the GPA could not be 'multilateralized'. With the reintroduction of agriculture and textiles and clothing into the GATT, procurement has therefore become the major 'hole' …