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Articles 1 - 15 of 15
Full-Text Articles in Law
An Aggregate Approach To Antitrust: Using New Data And Rulemaking To Preserve Drug Competition, C. Scott Hemphill
An Aggregate Approach To Antitrust: Using New Data And Rulemaking To Preserve Drug Competition, C. Scott Hemphill
Center for Contract and Economic Organization
This Article examines the "aggregation deficit" in antitrust: the pervasive lack of information, essential to choosing an optimal antitrust rule, about the frequency and costliness of anticompetitive activity. By synthesizing available information, the present analysis helps close the information gap for an important, unresolved issue in U.S. antitrust policy: patent settlements between brand-name drug makers and their generic rivals. The analysis draws upon a new dataset of 143 such settlements.
Due to the factual complexity of individual brand-generic settlements, important trends and arrangements become apparent only when multiple cases are examined collectively. This aggregate approach provides valuable information that can …
Bargaining Around Bankruptcy: Small Business Workouts And State Law, Edward R. Morrison
Bargaining Around Bankruptcy: Small Business Workouts And State Law, Edward R. Morrison
Faculty Scholarship
Federal bankruptcy law is rarely used by distressed small businesses. For every 100 that suspend operations, at most 20 file for bankruptcy. The rest use state law procedures to liquidate or reorganize. This paper documents the importance of these procedures and the conditions under which they are chosen using firm-level data on Chicago-area small businesses. I show that business owners bargain with senior lenders over the resolution of financial distress. Federal bankruptcy law is invoked only when bargaining fails. This tends to occur when there is more than one senior lender or when the debtor has defaulted on senior debt …
Redesigning The Sec: Does The Treasury Have A Better Idea?, John C. Coffee Jr., Hillary A. Sale
Redesigning The Sec: Does The Treasury Have A Better Idea?, John C. Coffee Jr., Hillary A. Sale
Faculty Scholarship
Symposiums supply a snapshot in time. By observing the common assumptions and shared frameworks of a collection of scholars writing contemporaneously, one gains both insight into the intellectual world of a past era and the ability to measure its distance from our own. Twenty-five years ago the Virginia Law Review organized a noted symposium (the "1984 Symposium") to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the SEC. A number of prominent scholars participated, and its articles have been much cited.
Civil Liability And Mandatory Disclosure, Merritt B. Fox
Civil Liability And Mandatory Disclosure, Merritt B. Fox
Faculty Scholarship
This Article explores the efficient design of civil liability for mandatory securities disclosure violations by established issuers. An issuer not publicly offering securities at the time of a violation should have no liability. Its annual filings should be signed by an external certifier – an investment bank or other well-capitalized entity with financial expertise. If the filing contains a material misstatement and the certifier fails to do due diligence, the certifier should face measured liability. Officers and directors should face similar liability, capped relative to their compensation but with no indemnification or insurance allowed. Damages should be payable to the …
Creditor Control And Conflict In Chapter 11, Kenneth M. Ayotte, Edward R. Morrison
Creditor Control And Conflict In Chapter 11, Kenneth M. Ayotte, Edward R. Morrison
Faculty Scholarship
We analyze a sample of large privately and publicly held businesses that filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions during 2001. We find pervasive creditor control. In contrast to traditional views of Chapter 11, equity holders and managers exercise little or no leverage during the reorganization process. 70 percent of CEOs are replaced in the two years before a bankruptcy filing, and few reorganization plans (at most 12 percent) deviate from the absolute priority rule to distribute value to equity holders. Senior lenders exercise significant control through stringent covenants, such as line-item budgets, in loans extended to firms in bankruptcy. Unsecured creditors …
Agenda For Private Sector Reform: Omnibus Policy Recommendations For A Post-Crisis Market, Millstein Center For Corporate Governance And Performance
Agenda For Private Sector Reform: Omnibus Policy Recommendations For A Post-Crisis Market, Millstein Center For Corporate Governance And Performance
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
The global financial crisis has exposed a raft of market weaknesses and failures The Center has concentrated on probing urgent, corporate governance-related issues where it identified apparent gaps in knowledge, insight and infrastructure. Policy Briefings have addressed the advisory vote on executive compensation; board-shareowner communications; proxy voting reform; independent board leadership; risk oversight; pay for performance; and shareowner stewardship. Using global perspectives, they address key concerns within the relevant subject areas and attempt to gather and present practical recommendations and ideas.
This report compiles summaries of the Center’s recommendations on these seven key areas from 2007 through mid-2009. The objective …
Pay, Risk And Stewardship: Private Sector Architecture For Future Capital Markets, Mariana Pargendler
Pay, Risk And Stewardship: Private Sector Architecture For Future Capital Markets, Mariana Pargendler
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
The recent financial crisis revealed a massive failure of institutions that populate the world’s capital markets. Banks, investors, ratings agencies, regulators and numerous other players demonstrated that confidence in market responses was misplaced. The loss of faith in capital market institutions has represented a significant hurdle to recovery as financial institutions continue to be wary of one another, and the public is wary of all of them.
Restoring trust in the system requires two distinct pillars of reform. The first pillar, reform of the financial regulatory system, both nationally and globally, has received most of the attention so far. Many …
Chairing The Board: The Case For Independent Leadership In Corporate North America, Millstein Center For Corporate Governance And Performance
Chairing The Board: The Case For Independent Leadership In Corporate North America, Millstein Center For Corporate Governance And Performance
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
The number of non-executive chairmen at companies in North America has been increasing year by year. Recent figures, according to the 2008 Spencer Stuart Board Index, indicate that the last decade has seen a growing trend in separating the roles of the Chief Executive Officer (ceo) and the chairman of the board. In 1998, 16% of the s&p 500 featured distinct chairmen. Data shows that in 2008 as many as 39% appoint someone other than the ceo to chair the board. Traditionally, even in companies that split the role, the chairman was not completely independent, but rather commonly the ex-ceo …
Voting Integrity: Practices For Investors And The Global Proxy Advisory Industry, Meagan Thompson-Mann
Voting Integrity: Practices For Investors And The Global Proxy Advisory Industry, Meagan Thompson-Mann
Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership
Accountability of corporate boards to shareowners rests in large part on the integrity of the system by which investors vote their proxy ballots. Shareowners rely on the vote to affect the governance of a company; corporate directors see the vote as a barometer of investor confidence in board stewardship. Outcomes determine the fate of director tenure, mergers, acquisitions, capital raising, remuneration plans and other critical decisions with sometimes profound consequences for stakeholders and the marketplace.
However, this briefing finds that the proxy voting system in the US and other markets is chronically subject to criticism that it is short on …
On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, And Contractual Conditions, Eric L. Talley
On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, And Contractual Conditions, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
This article uses the recent Delaware Chancery Court case of Hexion v. Huntsman as a template for motivating thoughts about how contract law should interpret contractual conditions in general – and "material adverse event" provisions in particular – within environments of extreme ambiguity (as opposed to risk). Although ambiguity and aversion there to bear some facial similarities to risk and risk aversion, an optimal contractual allocation of uncertainty does not always track the optimal allocation of risk. After establishing these intuitions as a conceptual proposition, I endeavor to test them empirically, using a unique data set of 528 actual material …
Enhancing Investor Protection And The Regulation Of Securities Markets, John C. Coffee Jr.
Enhancing Investor Protection And The Regulation Of Securities Markets, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
This is the congressional testimony of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., before the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, March 10, 2009.
"Say On Pay": Cautionary Notes On The U.K. Experience And The Case For Shareholder Opt-In, Jeffrey N. Gordon
"Say On Pay": Cautionary Notes On The U.K. Experience And The Case For Shareholder Opt-In, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
Shareholder and public dissatisfaction with executive compensation has led to calls for an annual shareholder advisory vote on firms’ compensation practices and policies, so-called “say on pay.” Proposed federal legislation would mandate “say on pay” generally for U.S. public companies. This Article assesses the case for such a mandatory federal rule in light of the U.K. experience with a similar regime adopted in 2002. The best argument for a mandatory rule is that it would destabilize pay practices that have produced excessive compensation and that would not yield to firm-by-firm pressure. This has not been the U.K. experience; pay continues …
Chrysler, Gm And The Future Of Chapter 11, Edward R. Morrison
Chrysler, Gm And The Future Of Chapter 11, Edward R. Morrison
Faculty Scholarship
Although they caused great controversy, the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies broke no new ground. They invoked procedures that are commonly observed in modern Chapter 11 reorganization cases. Government involvement did not distort the bankruptcy process; it instead exposed the reality that Chapter 11 offers secured creditors – especially those that supply financing during the bankruptcy case – control over the fate of distressed firms. Because the federal government supplied financing in the Chrysler and GM cases, it possessed the creditor control normally exercised by private lenders. The Treasury Department found itself with virtually the same, unchecked power that the FDIC …
The Empagran Exception: Between Illinois Brick And A Hard Place, Victor P. Goldberg
The Empagran Exception: Between Illinois Brick And A Hard Place, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
Before it was uncovered and prosecuted, the international vitamin cartel, known as "Vitamins, Inc." by its perpetrators, was extraordinarily successful. Estimates of cartel profits run as high as $18 billion (in 2003 dollars). In addition to substantial criminal sanctions, cartel members paid over $2 billion to American plaintiffs. When foreign plaintiffs tried to sue the foreign defendants in American courts, however, they encountered resistance. A trial court read the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act ("FTAIA") to restrict the reach of the Sherman Act and preclude foreign purchasers from suing the foreign defendants. The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that the facts …
Public Ownership. Firm Governance, And Litigation Risk, Eric L. Talley
Public Ownership. Firm Governance, And Litigation Risk, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
Many going-private transactions are motivated – at least ostensibly – by the desire to escape the burdens and costs of public ownership. Although these burdens have many purported manifestations, one commonly cited is the risk of litigation, which may be borne both directly by the firm and/or its fiduciaries or reflected in director and officer insurance premia funded at company expense. An important issue for the "litigation risk" justification of privatization is whether alternative (and less expensive) steps falling short of going private – such as governance reforms – may augur sufficiently against litigation exposure. In this Article, I consider …