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Series

Columbia Law School

2008

Business Organizations Law

Corporate governance

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Talking Governance: Board-Shareowner Communications On Executive Compensation, Stephen Davis, Stephen Alogna Jan 2008

Talking Governance: Board-Shareowner Communications On Executive Compensation, Stephen Davis, Stephen Alogna

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

Advantages stemming from board-shareowner communications on governance and executive pay outweigh the potential risks and costs of such dialogue. Regulation FD in the US should be seen as a caution rather than a barrier to such communication. Prompted by universal adoption of advisory ‘say on pay’ resolutions, UK companies have moved to integrate regular engagement with domestic investors into the annual process of framing corporate remuneration policies. Most US companies have not fully endeavored to engage their shareowners in the same manner, but some—motivated sometimes by crises—are experimenting with various models of dialogue. Companies can best manage effective engagement when …


Gatekeeper Failures: Why Important, What To Do, Merritt B. Fox Jan 2008

Gatekeeper Failures: Why Important, What To Do, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

The United States was hit by a wave of corporate scandals that crested between late 2001 and the end of 2002. Some were traditional scandals involving insiders looting company assets – the most prominent being Tyco, HealthSouth, and Adelphia. But most were what might be called "financial scandals": attempts by an issuer to maximize the market price of its securities by creating misimpressions as to what its future cash flows were likely to be. Enron and WorldCom were the most spectacular examples of these financial scandals. In scores of additional cases, the companies involved and their executives were sued by …


Sovereign Wealth Funds And Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response To The New Mercantilism, Ronald J. Gilson, Curtis J. Milhaupt Jan 2008

Sovereign Wealth Funds And Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response To The New Mercantilism, Ronald J. Gilson, Curtis J. Milhaupt

Faculty Scholarship

Keynes taught years ago that international cash flows are always political. Western response to the enormous increase in the number and the assets of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), and other government-directed investment vehicles that often get lumped together under the SWF label, proves Keynes right. To their most severe critics, SWFs are a threat to the sovereignty of the nations in whose corporations they invest. The heat of the metaphors matches the volume of the complaints. The nations whose corporations are targets of investments are said to be threatened with becoming "sharecropper" states if ownership of industry moves to foreign-government …