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Full-Text Articles in Law

Local Institutions, Foreign Investment And Alternative Strategies Of Development: Some Views From Practice, Tamara Lothian, Katharina Pistor Jan 2003

Local Institutions, Foreign Investment And Alternative Strategies Of Development: Some Views From Practice, Tamara Lothian, Katharina Pistor

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay summarizes the major insights gained from a panel discussion with legal practitioners about the relevance of local institutions to foreign direct investors. The Essay offers a critique of policy conclusions drawn from empirical studies that suggest a positive correlation between legal institutions and foreign investment flows. It points out that the data used in these studies are far too general to allow policy conclusions and that neither the data nor the policy conclusions are sufficiently attuned to the challenges or opportunities that foreign direct investment projects face on the ground. According to the results of the panel discussion, …


Engineering A Venture Capital Market: Lessons From The American Experience, Ronald J. Gilson Jan 2003

Engineering A Venture Capital Market: Lessons From The American Experience, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

The venture capital market and firms whose creation and early stages were financed by venture capital are among the crown jewels of the American economy. Beyond representing an important engine of macroeconomic growth and job creation, these firms have been a major force in commercializing cutting-edge science, whether through their impact on existing industries as with the radical changes in pharmaceuticals catalyzed by venture-backed firms' commercialization of biotechnology, or by their role in developing entirely new industries as with the emergence of the Internet and World Wide Web. The venture capital market thus provides a unique link between finance and …


Unregulable Defenses And The Perils Of Shareholder Choice, Jennifer Arlen, Eric L. Talley Jan 2003

Unregulable Defenses And The Perils Of Shareholder Choice, Jennifer Arlen, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

A significant debate rages within corporate law scholarship as to whether shareholders or managers should be granted authority over the tender offer process once a bid is imminent. Both sides generally agree that the issue depends on whether shareholders are capable of exercising informed choice over takeover bids. Supporters of managerial veto power contend that the arguments favoring professional management of publicly held firms carry over into the tender offer context. Proponents of shareholder choice, on the other hand, argue that shareholders can act on their own behalf in the special circumstances surrounding contests for corporate control.

This Article challenges …


Innovation In Corporate Law, Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Mark D. West Jan 2003

Innovation In Corporate Law, Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Mark D. West

Faculty Scholarship

In most countries large business enterprises today are organized as corporations. The corporation with its key attributes of independent personality, limited liability and free tradeability of shares has played a key role in most developed market economies since the 19th century and has made major inroads in emerging markets. We suggest that the resilience of the corporate form is a function of the adaptability of the legal framework to a changing environment. We analyze a country's capacity to innovate using the rate of statutory legal change, the flexibility of corporate law, and institutional change as indicators. Our findings suggest that …


Robust Public Debate: Realizing Free Speech In Workplace Representation Elections, Kate Andrias Jan 2003

Robust Public Debate: Realizing Free Speech In Workplace Representation Elections, Kate Andrias

Faculty Scholarship

The First Amendment stands as a guarantor of political freedom and as the “guardian of our democracy.” It seeks to expand the vitality of public discourse in order to enable Americans to become aware of the issues before them and to pursue their ends fully and freely. As the Supreme Court wrote in the canonical case of New York Times Co. v . Sullivan, the First Amendment’s function is to create the “uninhibited, robust and wide-open” public debate necessary for the exercise of self-governance.

The Amendment plays a prominent role in the regulation of workplace representation elections, the process …


Employee Stock Ownership After Enron: Proceedings Of The 2003 Annual Meeting, Association Of American Law Schools Section On Employee Benefits, Norman P. Stein, Colleen E. Medill, Susan J. Stabile, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Louis H. Diamond, Damon Silvers, Patricia E. Dilley Jan 2003

Employee Stock Ownership After Enron: Proceedings Of The 2003 Annual Meeting, Association Of American Law Schools Section On Employee Benefits, Norman P. Stein, Colleen E. Medill, Susan J. Stabile, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Louis H. Diamond, Damon Silvers, Patricia E. Dilley

Faculty Scholarship

This session is entitled "Employee Stock Ownership After Enron," and I assume that title has drawn into this room people who know something about either Enron or employee stock, or both. For our purposes, the Enron story has as its focus the Enron 401(k) plan, which was the principal retirement plan for most Enron employees. Employees could make elective contributions to the 401(k) plan, which offered nineteen investment options, one of which was Enron stock. The 401(k) plan also provided that Enron would match employee contributions up to 3 percent of compensation. Enron's match, however, was made in Enron stock. …


Governance Failures Of The Enron Board And The New Information Order Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Jeffrey N. Gordon Jan 2003

Governance Failures Of The Enron Board And The New Information Order Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

Analysis of the corporate governance crisis that manifested itself in the United States at the turn of the millennium requires separating its various strands. The Enron Corporation ("Enron") debacle and the dot corn bubble and collapse, for example, share some common elements but in other ways they are quite different. In both cases investors became aggressively enamored of an unsustainable business model. In the dot com case it was the belief that an innovator in a rapidly growing market could attain powerful first mover advantages that would produce an eventual cascade of profits, so that a current and increasing stream …


The Efficiency Of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, Zohar Goshen Jan 2003

The Efficiency Of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, Zohar Goshen

Faculty Scholarship

Corporate self-dealing may be controlled either by legal rules or by the unconstrained forces of the market. The regulatory options include an absolute prohibition on self-dealing, a prohibition on voting with conflicting interests (the "majority of the minority" requirement), and an imposition of fairness duties (the 'fairness test"). Using an economic analysis, this Article presents a unique theoretical framework for evaluating the relative efficiency of the attempts to control self-dealing adopted by five countries: The United States (Delaware in particular), the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and Italy.

The Article's analysis of the self-dealing problem is based on the novel theory …


Controlling Controlling Shareholders, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon Jan 2003

Controlling Controlling Shareholders, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

The rules governing controlling shareholders sit at the intersection of the two facets of the agency problem at the core of public corporations law. The first is the familiar principal-agency problem that arises from the separation of ownership and control. With only this facet in mind, a large shareholder may better police management than the standard panoply of market-oriented techniques. The second is the agency problem that arises between controlling and non-controlling shareholders, which produces the potential for private benefits of control. There is, however, a point of tangency between these facets. Because there are costs associated with holding a …