Law Commons^™

Lifting Labor’S Voice: A Principled Path Toward Greater Worker Voice And Power Within American Corporate Governance, Leo E. Strine Jr., Aneil Kovvali, Oluwatomi O. Williams

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

The dramatic decline in corporate gainsharing with American workers over the last two generations has contributed to stagnating wages, soaring inequality, and economic insecurity. There are global causes of greater inequality and depressed pay that go beyond the decline in workers’ share. But many public policymakers and economists believe that the reduced share of corporate prof its that American workers receive has been a major factor in the much larger increase in inequality that has occurred in the United States, compared to its market economy allies in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). To some, the explanation for …

Duty And Diversity, Chris Bummer, Leo E. Strine Jr.

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

In the wake of the brutal deaths of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, lawmakers and corporate boards from Wall Street to the West Coast have introduced a slew of reforms aimed at increasing Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (“DEI”) in corporations. Yet the reforms face difficulties ranging from possible constitutional challenges to critical limitations in their scale, scope, and degree of legal obligation and practical effects.

In this Article, we provide an old answer to the new questions facing DEI policy and offer the first close examination of how corporate law duties impel and facilitate corporate attention to diversity. Specifically, we …

Caremark And Esg, Perfect Together: A Practical Approach To Implementing An Integrated, Efficient, And Effective Caremark And Eesg Strategy, Leo E. Strine Jr., Kirby M. Smith, Reilly S. Steel

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

With increased calls from investors, legislators, and academics for corporations to consider employee, environmental, social, and governance factors (“EESG”) when making decisions, boards and managers are struggling to situate EESG within their existing reporting and organizational structures. Building on an emerging literature connecting EESG with corporate compliance, this Essay argues that EESG is best understood as an extension of the board’s duty to implement and monitor a compliance program under Caremark. If a company decides to do more than the legal minimum, it will simultaneously satisfy legitimate demands for strong EESG programs and promote compliance with the law. Building on …

Annual Report 2019-2020, Ira M. Millstein Center For Global Markets And Corporate Ownership

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

Looking back on the 2019-2020 academic year, we are pleased to reflect on another highly productive period for the Millstein Center.

Private Ownership At A Public Crossroads: Studying The Rapidly Evolving World Of Corporate Ownership, Ira M. Millstein Center For Global Markets And Corporate Ownership

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

Capital formation in the United States is currently in the midst of a significant transition with largely unexplored consequences for the ownership and control of American business, as well as significant implications for the future of the public equity markets. Although public equity markets remain vast and important, they are no longer the primary source of capital for business formation and growth. Increasingly, capital for business formation and growth is being raised — and held — privately from a relatively new set of institutional investors (most importantly, venture capital and private equity funds). As a result, ownership and control over …

Insulation By Separation: When Dual-Class Stock Met Corporate Spin-Offs, Young Ran Kim, Geeyoung Min

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

The recent rise of shareholder engagement has revamped companies’ corporate governance structures so as to empower shareholder rights and to constrain managerial opportunism. The general trend notwithstanding, this Article uncovers corporate spin-off transactions — which divide a single company into two or more companies — as a unique mechanism that insulates the management from shareholder intervention. In a spin-off, the company’s managers can fundamentally change the governance arrangements of the new spun-off company without being subject to monitoring mechanisms, such as shareholder approval or market check. Furthermore, most spin-off transactions enjoy tax benefits. The potential agency problems associated with the …

The Limits Of Smart Contracts, Jens Frankenreiter

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

This essay investigates the potential of smart contracts to replace the legal system as an infrastructure for transactions. It argues that (contract) law remains relevant for most transactions even if they are entirely structured by way of smart contract. The reason for this is that the power of smart contracts to create and enforce obligations against attempts by the legal system to thwart their execution is limited. These limitations are most relevant for obligations to perform certain actions outside the blockchain, but also apply to other obligations contingent on facts outside the records stored on the blockchain.

Active Firms And Active Shareholders: Corporate Political Activity And Shareholder Proposals, Geeyoung Min, Hye Young You

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

This article reveals the positions of corporations not only as active players in politics but also as targets of activist shareholders with opposing political preferences. We examine whether a firm’s political orientation, as measured by its political spending, serves as a driver of shareholder proposal submissions, one manifestation of shareholder activism. Using data on S&P 500 companies for 1997–2014, we find that the divergence in political orientation between shareholders and corporate management is strongly associated with the number of submissions of shareholder proposals on environmental or social issues. Firms that contribute more to the Republican Party are more likely to …

Annual Report 2018, Ira M. Millstein Center For Global Markets And Corporate Ownership

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

We are excited to update you after a very active 2018, which brought about positive change here at the Millstein Center.

Contractarian Theory And Unilateral Bylaw Amendments, Albert H. Choi, Geeyoung Min

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

Corporate directors have been utilizing a potent mechanism in dealing with shareholder activism and shareholder litigation: the right to unilaterally amend corporate bylaws. Directors have exercised this right, for instance, to impose various requirements on who can nominate a director or call a special shareholder meeting, or to designate an exclusive forum where the shareholders can bring suit. Based on the theory that corporate charters and bylaws constitute a “contract” between the shareholders and the corporation, courts have blessed many of the bylaws that directors have unilaterally adopted. This Article examines the contractarian theory by drawing a parallel between amending …

Shareholder Voice In Corporate Charter Amendments, Geeyoung Min

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

State corporate laws require shareholder approval for corporate charter amendments, but only the board of directors has the power to propose how to amend charters. The directors’ exclusive power over charter amendment proposals creates a potential for managerial opportunism by refusing to propose amendments that empower shareholders or by pursuing amendments that favor managers. While shareholder approval can theoretically serve as a check against such opportunism, dispersed shareholders’ rational apathy and collective action problems, can also prevent them from being effective monitors. Prior scholarship has thus viewed charter amendments with suspicion, but there has been no systematic, empirical examination to …

Greater Expectations: Strategies For Effective Board Meeting Preparation, Jonathan Kim, Marcel Bucsescu

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

Directors face an increasingly complex environment in which their businesses operate. That complexity can present opportunities for corporations that adapt, and also places new pressures on boards to respond effectively. One strategy for directors to consider is to adapt their approaches to preparing for board meetings by focusing not just on company specific reporting and decisions, but also by acting as the “eyes and ears” for management on key issues for the company. This article makes practical suggestions for directors to consider as they approach their board meeting preparation with this broader view in mind.

Environmental And Social Sustainability In The Boardroom, Jon Lukomnik

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

The last 10 years has seen a remarkable shift in the attention and importance of social and environmental issues for public corporations. This has meant an increased focus by boards on these important matters.

Climate change, human rights, corporate political influence, and inequality are just some of the issues that are being raised by shareholders and other stakeholders. As calls for corporate transparency grow, how boards incorporate these issues into their decision making processes, disclose them, and address them from a risk perspective will continue to garner attention.

The Changing Landscape Of The Capital Markets, Barbara Krumsiek

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

Much has been made of the rise of activist hedge funds over the past five years. But the shifts in the makeup of the investor community run much deeper than that, impacting both capital formation and capital deployment.

From the proliferation of hedge funds and the emergence of SRI and other new investment strategies, to the massive shift of funds to passive investors, the intermediation of the investment chain, and the concentration of ownership in the largest institutional investors, understanding the trend lines in the capital markets is integral to understanding where governance and the performance of public corporations goes …

Fiduciary Duties Of Corporate Directors In Uncertain Times, Ellen J. Odoner, Stephen A. Radin, Lyuba A. Goltser, Andrew E. Blumberg

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

Directors addressing new political uncertainties, a host of heightened challenges and asserted “best practices” from many sources may understandably ask whether their fiduciary duties have changed as well. This paper synthesizes the latest decisions of the Delaware courts on the standards of conduct for directors and the standards by which their conduct is reviewed. While directors should expect uncertainty to be a fact of corporate life for the foreseeable future, this paper emphasizes that neither the fiduciary duties of directors nor the protections afforded them have changed. Disinterested and independent directors acting in good faith continue to have broad protections …

Board Excellence And Fiduciary Duties Of Corporate Directors, E. Norman Veasey, Ira M. Millstein

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

This article is intended for corporate directors and explores the key issues that directors should understand with respect to their fiduciary duties. An accompanying paper authored by Ellen Odoner, Stephen Radin, Lyuba Goltser, and Andrew Blumberg of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP provides a detailed analysis of the concepts discussed in this article and is recommended to general counsel, as they advise their corporate boards with respect to their fiduciary duties, as well as directors who wish to have a better understanding of their own fiduciary duties.

Report From The General Counsel Summit On Short-Termism And Public Trust, Ira M. Millstein Center For Global Markets And Corporate Ownership

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

This summary report was prepared for participants in the General Counsel Corporate Governance Summit and presents some of the key discussion topics and views of participants at the summit. It is not intended to provide a complete summary or represent a unanimous consensus of the summit’s proceedings.

Adapting Global Standards To A Changing World, Serdar Çelik, Mats Isaksson

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

In 1996, Ira Millstein received a phone call from Paris. It came from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) asking him to head a small international group of distinguished businesspeople, including Sir Adrian Cadbury. Their assignment would be to provide economists and policy makers with advice for future work in the area of corporate governance. At the time, the topic was little understood among policy makers and its wider economic implications were rarely discussed. But OECD, already well known for its analysis of both macroeconomics and structural policies, wanted to change that. They looked at corporate governance as …

Short-Termism, Douglas Chia

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

Perhaps no topic in corporate governance has garnered more and stronger reactions than the debate over whether shorttermism is an issue for public corporations, the public markets, or the economy.

From the explosion in recent years of buybacks and dividends, to the declines in investment in research and development and capital expenditures, and unprecedented corporate profits and cash holdings, some argue that capitalism has focused in on the wrong outcomes, or worse, been coopted by the few at the expense of the many.

This essay will lay out the data and arguments over short-termism and what structural changes may be …

The Future Of Finance Colloquium, Ira M. Millstein Center For Global Markets And Corporate Ownership

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

On April 25, 2014, the Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership and the CFA Institute hosted the Future of Finance Colloquium. The following is a summary of the panel discussions.

On The Use And Misuse Of Stock Price, Ira M. Millstein Center For Global Markets And Corporate Ownership

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

In 2013, in an effort to better understand the purpose, use, and potential misuse of stock prices in public equity markets, the Millstein Center and the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRCi) issued a call for papers on the role prices play as a corporate governance mechanism. In lieu of completed projects, proposals were sought for new research that explored how equity prices affect the decision-making processes of corporate management, boards of directors, and investors. On September 19, 2014, the Millstein Center and the IRRCi hosted a gathering entitled the Conference on the Use and Misuse of Stock Price, …

Discussion On Transparent And Effective Disclosure, Ira M. Millstein Center For Global Markets And Corporate Ownership

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

On January 22, 2015, the Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership and the Center for Audit Quality hosted a Discussion on Transparent and Effective Disclosure. The following is a summary of the panel discussions.

Inversions: Implications For Tax Planning, Tax Policy, And Corporate Governance, Ira M. Millstein Center For Global Markets And Corporate Ownership

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

On February 27, 2015, the Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership, the Richard Paul Richman Center, the Charles Evans Gerber Transactional Studies Center, and David Polk & Wardwell hosted a conference on Inversions: Implications for Tax Planning, Tax Policy, and Corporate Governance. The following is a summary of the panel discussions.

Proxy Access 2.0: A Recap On 1.0 And The Economic Analysis, Ira M. Millstein Center For Global Markets And Corporate Ownership

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

On April 27, 2015, the Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership and the CFA Institute hosted a discussion on the state of proxy access. The following is a summary of the panel discussion.

Key Topics In Corporate Governance: Disclosure, Ira M. Millstein Center For Global Markets And Corporate Ownership

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

On June 18, 2015, the Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership hosted a symposium on transparency in the corporate and investment communities. The half-day event brought together prominent speakers from the business, regulatory and academic sectors to discuss current trends and emerging issues associated with disclosure. In a related vein, panelists also debated the case for furthering engagement with retail investors whose needs and resources may differ, at times substantially, from their institutional counterparts. The following is a summary of the panel discussions.

State Contract Law And Debt Contracts, Colleen Honigsberg, Sharon Katz, Gil Sadka

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

This paper examines the relationship between debt contracts and state contract law. We first develop an index to evaluate whether each state’s law is favorable or unfavorable to lenders. We then analyze how the contract terms, the frequency of covenant violations, and the repercussions of covenant violations vary across states. We find that cash collateral is most likely to be used when the contract is governed by law that is favorable to debtors and that out-of-state borrowers who use favorable law pay higher yield spreads. In addition, when the law is favorable to lenders, there are significantly fewer covenant violations, …

Toward A Constitutional Review Of The Poison Pill, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson Jr.

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

We argue that the state-law rules governing poison pills are vulnerable to challenges based on preemption by the Williams Act. Such challenges, we show, could well have a major impact on the corporate law landscape.

The Williams Act established a federal regime regulating unsolicited tender offers, but states subsequently developed a body of state antitakeover laws that impose additional impediments to such offers. In a series of well-known cases during the 1970s and 1980s, the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, held some of these state antitakeover laws preempted by the Williams Act. To date, however, federal courts and commentators …

Changes In Ownership: Beyond The Berle-Means Paradigm, Ira M. Millstein Center For Global Markets And Corporate Ownership

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

The “Changes in Ownership: Beyond the Berle-Means Paradigm” Symposium, held April 2013, explored whether, and how, the recent explosion of new ownership models alters the paradigm of dispersed ownership developed by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means three generations ago. That model indicated that public corporations were owned by dispersed shareholders whose separate ownership positions were too small to justify extensive monitoring of managerial performance. This view of the distribution of ownership in U.S. corporations has been foundational for both much academic work and for much of corporate law and governance, which have been aimed at addressing the monitoring shortfall.

The …

Pre-Disclosure Accumulations By Activist Investors: Evidence And Policy, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Wei Jiang

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is currently considering a rulemaking petition requesting that the Commission shorten the ten-day window, established by Section 13(d) of the Williams Act, within which investors must publicly disclose purchases of a five percent or greater stake in public companies. In this Article, we provide the first systematic empirical evidence on these disclosures and find that several of the petition's factual premises are not consistent with the evidence.

Our analysis is based on about 2,000 filings by activist hedge funds during the period of 1994-2007. We find that the data are inconsistent with the petition's …

Conscience, Incorporated, James D. Nelson

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

Do business corporations have free exercise rights? This question has become critically important in recent challenges to the Affordable Care Act’s so-called “contraception mandate.” A host of businesses selling ordinary goods and services claim that they cannot be compelled to provide employees with insurance that covers contraception. Courts have divided over whether corporations can assert rights of conscience, and existing theoretical accounts fail to provide guidance on this question.

This Article offers a new normative framework for evaluating corporate claims of conscience. Drawing on theories of conscience and collective rights, it develops a “social theory” of conscience that explains how …