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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Law
Investment Promotion Agencies And Sustainable Fdi: Moving Toward The Fourth Generation Of Investment Promotion, Columbia Center On Sustainable Investment, World Association Of Investment Promotion Agencies
Investment Promotion Agencies And Sustainable Fdi: Moving Toward The Fourth Generation Of Investment Promotion, Columbia Center On Sustainable Investment, World Association Of Investment Promotion Agencies
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications
In April and May 2010, CCSI supported WAIPA to conduct its annual survey. This report, Investment Promotion Agencies and Sustainable FDI: Moving toward the Fourth Generation of Investment Promotion, benchmarks the responses of IPAs regarding sustainable FDI and its four dimensions (economic development, environmental sustainability, social development, governance) and finds, among other things, that these are unevenly addressed by investment promotion strategies and investment incentives. The report also draws attention to the desirability of attracting sustainable FDI, rather than focusing on volume of investment alone.
In 2017, CCSI also helped the World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) to conduct …
Excuse Doctrine: The Eisenberg Uncertainty Principle, Victor P. Goldberg
Excuse Doctrine: The Eisenberg Uncertainty Principle, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
The world is in a bit of a mess. Oil prices soared to more than $140 per barrel and within months plummeted to below $40. The pound fell from $2 to less than $1.40. Housing and stock prices crashed. Foreclosures, bankruptcies, and bailouts became newspaper staples. When things go awry like this, inevitably many people and firms regret having entered into contracts under more favorable circumstances. Many of them will be looking for ways to limit, or better yet, avoid the consequences. A preeminent contracts scholar, Melvin Eisenberg (2009), has provided them with considerable ammunition in a recent paper, arguing …
Energy Policy For An Economic Downturn: A Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, Thomas W. Merrill, David M. Schizer
Energy Policy For An Economic Downturn: A Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, Thomas W. Merrill, David M. Schizer
Faculty Scholarship
A compelling case can be made for reducing America's consumption of petroleum fuels. Nearly all analysts think that the way to slash consumption of petroleum fuels is through an end-user tax. There is, however, widespread public opposition to higher gasoline taxes. Furthermore, in a recession the appropriate fiscal policy is to cut taxes, not to raise them. This paper proposes a method of stabilizing petroleum fuel prices at a sufficiently high level, without reducing aggregate consumer purchasing power. We introduce a revenue-neutral petroleum fuel price stabilization plan, called the "PFPS" plan for short Under this plan, a government surcharge on …
Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons For Developing Democracies, Ronald J. Gilson, Curtis J. Milhaupt
Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons For Developing Democracies, Ronald J. Gilson, Curtis J. Milhaupt
Faculty Scholarship
The post-war experience of developing countries leads to two depressing conclusions: only a small number of countries have successfully developed; and development theory has not produced development. In this article we examine one critical fact that might provide insights into the development conundrum: Some autocratic regimes have fundamentally transformed their economies, despite serious deficiencies along a range of other dimensions. Our aim is to understand how growth came about in these regimes, and whether emerging democracies might learn something important from these experiences.
Our thesis is that in these economically successful countries, the authoritarian regime managed a critical juncture in …
Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, And Costs Lives (Introduction), Michael A. Heller
Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, And Costs Lives (Introduction), Michael A. Heller
Faculty Scholarship
Twenty-five new runways would eliminate most air travel delays in America; fifty patent owners are blocking a major drug company from creating a cancer cure; 90 percent of our broadcast spectrum sits idle while American cell phone service suffers. These problems have solutions that can jump-start innovation and help save our troubled economy. So, what's holding us back?
Bail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital To Mitigate Systemic Risk, John C. Coffee Jr.
Bail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital To Mitigate Systemic Risk, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Because the quickest, simplest way for a financial institution to increase its profitability is to increase its leverage, an enduring tension will exist between regulators and systemically significant financial institutions over the issues of risk and leverage. Many have suggested that the 2008 financial crisis was caused because financial institutions were induced to increase leverage because of flawed systems of executive compensation. Still, there is growing evidence that shareholders acquiesced in these compensation formulas to cause managers to accept higher risk and leverage. Shareholder pressure then is a factor that could induce the failure of a systemically significant financial institution. …
Host’S Dilemma: Rethinking Eu Banking Regulation In Light Of The Global Crisis, Katharina Pistor
Host’S Dilemma: Rethinking Eu Banking Regulation In Light Of The Global Crisis, Katharina Pistor
Faculty Scholarship
The quest for integrating financial markets into a single global marketplace has produced a host of legal and regulatory measures over the past two decades aimed at taming national protectionism, easing access to foreign markets, and lowering the regulatory burden for financial intermediaries that operate trans-nationally. Home country regulation and supervision – based on commonly agreed prudential standards – has become the core principle in the design of regulatory structures. This principle, first established as the “Basel Concordat” in a series of reports issued by the Bank of International Settlement in Basel has also informed financial regulation in the EU. …
Hoffman V. Red Owl Stores And The Limits Of The Legal Method, Robert E. Scott
Hoffman V. Red Owl Stores And The Limits Of The Legal Method, Robert E. Scott
Faculty Scholarship
According to the overwhelming majority view, promissory estoppel is not an appropriate ground for legally enforcing statements made during preliminary negotiations unless there is a “clear and unambiguous promise” on which the counterparty reasonably and foreseeably relies. Bill Whitford and Stewart Macaulay were among the first scholars to note the apparent absence of such a promise in the case of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores. Several years ago, after studying the trial record, I concluded that the best explanation for the breakdown in negotiations was the fundamental misunderstanding between the parties as to the amount and nature of Hoffmann’s …
A Short History Of Tontines, Kent Mckeever
A Short History Of Tontines, Kent Mckeever
Faculty Scholarship
A tontine is an investment scheme through which shareholders derive some form of profit or benefit while they are living, but the value of each share devolves to the other participants and not the shareholder's heirs on the death of each shareholder. The tontine is usually brought to an end through a dissolution and distribution of assets to the living shareholders when the number of shareholders reaches an agreed small number.
If people know about tontines at all, they tend to visualize the most extreme form – a joint investment whose heritable ownership ends up with the last living shareholder. …