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Full-Text Articles in Law

Criminal Coercion And Freedom Of Speech, Kent Greenawalt Jan 1984

Criminal Coercion And Freedom Of Speech, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

This essay about constitutional limits on criminal coercion concerns a piece of a larger puzzle; how freedom of expression impinges on crimes that involve communication. The essay has two interrelated purposes. One is to reach some rather specific conclusions about the kinds of coercive threats that enjoy constitutional protection and to suggest how legislative formulations of criminal coercion can minimize coverage of such threats. The second purpose, more general and theoretical, is to show how the boundaries of freedom of expression can be understood and how courts can employ those boundaries to arrive at specific tests of constitutional protection. The …


Some Unwise Reflections About Discretion, George P. Fletcher Jan 1984

Some Unwise Reflections About Discretion, George P. Fletcher

Faculty Scholarship

In listening to discussions about discretion in the criminal process, one has the sense of sharply cut distinctions slipping toward a black hole in our language. All decisions by police, prosecutors, judges and jury are routinely called discretionary. This usage pervades respectable, basically sound papers. In a recent article in the Yale Law Journal, Goldstein and Marcus seek to demonstrate that discretion pervades the decisions of French, German and Italian prosecutors. They write: "Claims that prosecutorial discretion has been eliminated, or is supervised closely, are exaggerated. Discretion is exercised in each of the systems [French, German and Italian] for …


The Perplexing Borders Of Justification And Excuse, Kent Greenawalt Jan 1984

The Perplexing Borders Of Justification And Excuse, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

This Article's central theme is that Anglo-American criminal law should not attempt to distinguish between justification and excuse in a fully systematic way. I explore three possible bases for drawing the distinction: (1) a distinction between warranted and wrongful conduct; (2) a division between general and individual claims; and (3) a distinction based on the rights of others. I show why none of these bases yields a clear and simple criterion for categorization. The difficulty rests largely on the conceptual fuzziness of the terms ''justification" and "excuse" in ordinary usage and on the uneasy quality of many of the moral …