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Full-Text Articles in Law
Bargaining About Future Jeopardy, Daniel Richman
Bargaining About Future Jeopardy, Daniel Richman
Faculty Scholarship
The debate about how much protection criminal defendants should have against successive prosecutions has generally been conducted in the context of how to interpret the Double Jeopardy Clause. The doctrinal focus of this debate ignores the fact that for the huge majority of defendants – those who plead guilty instead of standing trial – the Double Jeopardy Clause simply sets a default rule, establishing a minimum level of protection when defendants choose not to bargain about the possibility of future charges. In this Article, Professor Richman examines the world that exists in the shadow of minimalist double jeopardy doctrine, exploring …
The Roles Of The State And The Market In Establishing Property Rights, Andrzej Rapaczynski
The Roles Of The State And The Market In Establishing Property Rights, Andrzej Rapaczynski
Faculty Scholarship
Using the experiences of Eastern Europe as an example, this article argues that, contrary to the economists' assumption that property rights are a precondition of a market economy, market institutions are often a prerequisite for a viable private property regime. Progress in the development of complex property rights in Eastern Europe, thus, cannot be expected to come primarily from a perfection of the legal system. Instead, it is more likely to arise as a market response to the demand for property rights. Indeed, legal entitlements can only be expected to become effective against a background of self-enforcing market mechanisms.
When Should An Offer Stick? The Economics Of Promissory Estoppel In Preliminary Negotiations, Avery W. Katz
When Should An Offer Stick? The Economics Of Promissory Estoppel In Preliminary Negotiations, Avery W. Katz
Faculty Scholarship
The purpose of this Article is to examine the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as it applies in the context of preliminary negotiations, from the viewpoint of the economic theory of rational choice. This is part of a larger project that attempts to understand better the regulatory role of contract formation law generally. From a regulatory vantage point, estoppel and related legal doctrines operate as economic regulations; they shape the bargaining process by influencing the negotiators' incentives to make and to rely on preliminary communications. As with all economic regulations, however, some rules do better than others at promoting efficient exchange, …