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Columbia Law School

Communications Law

Faculty Scholarship

New York University Law Review

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Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Law

Does The Constitution Require That We Kill The Competitive Goose? Pricing Local Phone Services To Rivals, William J. Baumol, Thomas W. Merrill Jan 1998

Does The Constitution Require That We Kill The Competitive Goose? Pricing Local Phone Services To Rivals, William J. Baumol, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

This Article concludes a series by these authors and Professors J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber, published last year in this journal. Here, Professors Baumol and Merrill address the issues surrounding the pricing of local phone services to long distance rivals, clarifying their points of agreement and disagreement with Sidak and Spulber. In their previous articles, Sidak and Spulber argued that the movement toward competition in local telephone service should be accompanied by substantial compensation to existing local telephone carriers, a view that Baumol and Merrill do not share. Rather, they note three points of disagreement between Sidak and …


Deregulatory Takings, Breach Of The Regulatory Contract, And The Telecommunications Act Of 1996, William J. Baumol, Thomas W. Merrill Jan 1997

Deregulatory Takings, Breach Of The Regulatory Contract, And The Telecommunications Act Of 1996, William J. Baumol, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Professors Baumol and Merrill reply to Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract, published last year in this Review, which argued that the price incumbents may charge potential competitors for bottleneck facilities under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 should be based not on forward-looking costs but on historical costs. Professors Baumol and Merrill contend that pricing with reference to historical costs would depart from the principles called for by economic analysis for efficient pricing and they further argue that neither the Takings Clause nor the regulatory contract precludes the use of forward-looking costs in setting prices. If a taking …