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Full-Text Articles in Law

A Short History Of Tontines, Kent Mckeever Jan 2010

A Short History Of Tontines, Kent Mckeever

Faculty Scholarship

A tontine is an investment scheme through which shareholders derive some form of profit or benefit while they are living, but the value of each share devolves to the other participants and not the shareholder's heirs on the death of each shareholder. The tontine is usually brought to an end through a dissolution and distribution of assets to the living shareholders when the number of shareholders reaches an agreed small number.

If people know about tontines at all, they tend to visualize the most extreme form – a joint investment whose heritable ownership ends up with the last living shareholder. …


Saving Up For Bankruptcy, Ronald J. Mann, Katherine Porter Jan 2010

Saving Up For Bankruptcy, Ronald J. Mann, Katherine Porter

Faculty Scholarship

Bankruptcy is a numbers game. Policymaking, public perception, and the scholarly literature are captivated with the number of annual bankruptcy filings, which hit one million in 2008. The number of annual bankruptcy filings has become a barometer of economic health, reflecting an implicit assumption that bankruptcy is a useful proxy for financial distress.

But at the level of the individual family, the causative relation between financial distress and bankruptcy filings is unclear. On the one hand, only a fraction of those in serious financial distress will ever file for bankruptcy. For example, a study by Michelle White examined a group …


Panel 3: Bankruptcy & Restructuring Of Financial Institutions, Barry E. Adler, William A. Ackman, Marcia L. Goldstein, Arthur J. Gonzalez, Michael J. Krimminger, Edward R. Morrison Jan 2010

Panel 3: Bankruptcy & Restructuring Of Financial Institutions, Barry E. Adler, William A. Ackman, Marcia L. Goldstein, Arthur J. Gonzalez, Michael J. Krimminger, Edward R. Morrison

Faculty Scholarship

Barry Adler: Thank you all for being here. It is an honor for me to be on this panel and an honor to moderate it. Let me introduce our panel before we get started. William A. Ackman, the founder and CEO of Pershing Square Capital Management; Marsha Goldstein, a partner and chair of the business finance and restructuring department at Weil, Gotshal; the Honorable Arthur Gonzalez, a judge in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York; and Ed Morrison, the Harvey Miller Professor of Law and Economics at Columbia Law School. Also on this panel is …


Host’S Dilemma: Rethinking Eu Banking Regulation In Light Of The Global Crisis, Katharina Pistor Jan 2010

Host’S Dilemma: Rethinking Eu Banking Regulation In Light Of The Global Crisis, Katharina Pistor

Faculty Scholarship

The quest for integrating financial markets into a single global marketplace has produced a host of legal and regulatory measures over the past two decades aimed at taming national protectionism, easing access to foreign markets, and lowering the regulatory burden for financial intermediaries that operate trans-nationally. Home country regulation and supervision – based on commonly agreed prudential standards – has become the core principle in the design of regulatory structures. This principle, first established as the “Basel Concordat” in a series of reports issued by the Bank of International Settlement in Basel has also informed financial regulation in the EU. …


Bail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital To Mitigate Systemic Risk, John C. Coffee Jr. Jan 2010

Bail-Ins Versus Bail-Outs: Using Contingent Capital To Mitigate Systemic Risk, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Because the quickest, simplest way for a financial institution to increase its profitability is to increase its leverage, an enduring tension will exist between regulators and systemically significant financial institutions over the issues of risk and leverage. Many have suggested that the 2008 financial crisis was caused because financial institutions were induced to increase leverage because of flawed systems of executive compensation. Still, there is growing evidence that shareholders acquiesced in these compensation formulas to cause managers to accept higher risk and leverage. Shareholder pressure then is a factor that could induce the failure of a systemically significant financial institution. …