Law Commons^™

Originalism, Official History, And Perspectives Versus Methodologies, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper addresses a well-worn topic: originalism, the theory that judges should interpret the Constitution in a manner consistent with the intent of its framers. I am interested in the real-world effects of originalism. The primary effect advanced by originalists is the tendency of the approach to constrain the discretion of judges. However, another effect of originalism that I identify is the creation of official histories, a practice that imposes a hidden tax on society. Another question I consider is whether originalism should be considered a methodology of analyzing the law or a perspective on the law. I argue that …

Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

What did the “Decision of 1789” decide about presidential removal power, if anything? It turns out that an emerging consensus of scholars agrees that there was not much consensus in the First Congress.

Two more questions follow: Is the “unitary executive theory” based on originalism, and if so, is originalism a reliable method of interpretation based on historical evidence?

The unitary executive theory posits that a president has exclusive and “indefeasible” executive powers (i.e., powers beyond congressional and judicial checks and balances). This panel was an opportunity for unitary executive theorists and their critics to debate recent historical research questioning …

Freehold Offices Vs. 'Despotic Displacement': Why Article Ii 'Executive Power' Did Not Include Removal, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The Roberts Court has relied on an assertion that Article II’s “executive power” implied an “indefeasible” or unconditional presidential removal power. In the wake of growing historical evidence against their theory, unitary executive theorists have fallen back on a claim of a “backdrop” or default removal rule from English and other European monarchies. However, unitary theorists have not provided support for these repeated assertions, while making a remarkable number of errors, especially in the recent “The Executive Power of Removal” (Harvard L. Rev. 2023).

This Article offers an explanation for the difficulty in supporting this historical claim: Because …

Amicus Brief In Sec V. Jarkesy On Original Public Meaning Of Article Ii & Presidential Removal, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

In holding that the SEC’s administrative law judges’ protections against removal were unconstitutional, the Fifth Circuit extended Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 447 (2010), and Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020). Those precedents were based on an incomplete historical record. Subsequent historical research shows that the Founding generation never understood Article II to grant the President an indefeasible removal power.

To be sure, this evidence does not suggest Congress should have unlimited power to protect any executive office or delegate removal to itself. Rather, the bottom line is that the evidence of original public …

Equivocal Originalism, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

"Originalism" is a term shrouded in ambiguity and ripe for equivocation. A recent article by Stephen Sachs in the Harvard Law Review tries to clarify the discussion by distinguishing between originalism as a decision standard, or a set of criteria for ascertaining the truth conditions for propositions, and a decision procedure, or a mechanism for ascertaining whether those truth conditions are satisfied in any given context. That is a helpful distinction, but it still leaves much room for multiple and confusing uses of the term originalism. Jumping off from comments on Professor Sachs's article by Mitchell Berman and Judge Andrew …

Vesting, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

"The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." The Executive Vesting Clause is one of three originalist pillars for the unitary executive theory, the idea that the President possesses executive powers like removal without congressional limitations (that is, the powers are indefeasible). An underlying assumption is that "vest" connotes a formalist approach to separation of powers rather than a more functional system of Madisonian checks and balances. Assumptions about "vesting" for official powers are likely the result of semantic drift from property rights and ahistoric projections back from the later Marshall Court doctrine …

Nondelegation And Originalism, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

Originalism certainly isn’t what it used to be. From a fringe theory with few adherents it has, in recent decades, become the dominant conservative legal weapon deployed against nearly every liberal legal development since the dawn of the twentieth century, particularly the acceptance of the administrative state and the delegation of rulemaking power to agencies. Professor Kurt Eggert’s recent article adds to the mounting evidence that originalism is not a credible legal theory especially when deployed against Congress’s choices concerning the proper structure of the regulatory state.

The Immorality Of Originalism, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The central claim of this essay is that in interpreting the U.S. Constitution, it is immoral to choose original intent over social welfare, broadly conceived. Once this argument is laid out and defended on its own terms, I support the central claim with a variety of arguments, including the defective process pursuant to which the Constitution was enacted, the deeply flawed substantive content of the Constitution, the incongruity of fidelity to the views of a generation of revolutionaries, the current virtual imperviousness of the Constitution to amendment, the failure of the Constitution to resolve fundamental questions concerning the allocation of …

Removal Of Context: Blackstone, Limited Monarchy, And The Limits Of Unitary Originalism, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court's recent decisions that the President has an unconditional or indefeasible removal power rely on textual and historical assumptions and a "removal of context." This article focuses on the "executive power" part of the Vesting Clause and particularly the unitary theorists' misuse of Blackstone. Unitary executive theorists overlook the problems of relying on England's limited monarchy: the era's rise of Parliamentary supremacy over the Crown and its power to eliminate or regulate (i.e., make defeasible) royal prerogatives. Unitary theorists provide no evidence that executive removal was ever identified as a "royal prerogative" or a default royal power. The …

The Jury Trial Reinvented, Christopher Robertson, Michael Shammas

Faculty Scholarship

The Framers of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the United States Constitution recognized that jury trials were essential for maintaining democratic legitimacy and avoiding epistemic crises. As an institution, the jury trial is purpose-built to engage citizens in the process of deliberative, participatory democracy with ground rules. The jury trial provides a carefully constructed setting aimed at sorting truth from falsehood.

Despite its value, the jury trial has been under assault for decades. Concededly, jury trials can sometimes be inefficient, unreliable, unpredictable, and impractical. The COVID–19 pandemic rendered most physical jury trials unworkable but spurred some courts to begin …

The Constitution, The Common Good, And The Ambition Of Adrian Vermeule, Sotirios Barber, Stephen Macedo, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Public trust in the U.S. government has declined steadily over the last sixty years, from 73% in 1958 to 17% in 2018 (Pew 12/9/20). Public support for the U.S. Constitution has remained higher. When support for the government dipped to an all-time low of 15% in 2010, support for the Constitution stood at 74%. But the gap has narrowed. From 2010 to 2017 support for the Constitution fell from 74% to around 50%—a drop of 24 points in seven years (AP/NCC 8/12; Rasmussen 2017). These figures suggest that if Americans continue to believe that their government isn’t working, they’ll eventually …

Revisionist History? Responding To Gun Violence Under Historical Limitations, Michael Ulrich

Faculty Scholarship

In the D.C. Circuit case Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), Judge Kavanaugh wrote that “Heller and McDonald leave little doubt that courts are to assess gun bans and regulations based on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny.” Now Justice Kavanaugh, will he find support on the highest court for what was then a dissenting view? Chief Justice Roberts, during oral arguments for Heller I, asked “Isn’t it enough to…look at the various regulations that were available at the time…and determine how these—how this restriction and the scope of this …

Response To Bruce Frohnen’S Review Of Fidelity To Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings And Against Originalisms, James E. Fleming, Bruce P. Frohnen

Faculty Scholarship

It is a privilege to participate in this exchange with Bruce Frohnen concerning our books. In my Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, I observe that in recent years, many have assumed that originalists have a monopoly on concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretation. I reject all forms of originalism and defend a moral reading of the United States Constitution. Such a conception views the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political principles, not codifying concrete historical rules or practices. It sees interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments about how they are best understood, not merely historical research to …

Critical Dialogue, James E. Fleming, Bruce P. Frohnen

Faculty Scholarship

It is a privilege to participate in this exchange with Bruce Frohnen concerning our books. In my Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, I observe that in recent years, many have assumed that originalists have a monopoly on concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretation. I reject all forms of originalism and defend a moral reading of the United States Constitution. Such a conception views the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political principles, not codifying concrete historical rules or practices. It sees interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments about how they are best understood, not merely historical research to …

Confronting Crawford: Justice Scalia, The Judicial Method, And The Limits(?) Of Originalism, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Crawford v. Washington, which revamped (and even revolutionized) interpretation and application of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, just might be Justice Scalia’s most important majority opinion, for three reasons. First, its impact on the criminal justice system has been immense, and even if the case is overruled in the near future, as seems quite possible, that effect will still likely exceed the concrete impact of any other opinion that he wrote. Second, and more importantly, Crawford emphasizes the trite but crucial point that methodology matters. Crawford has generally been a boon to criminal defendants and a bane to prosecutors. When …

Fidelity To Our Imperfect Constitution: A Reply To Six Views, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

I am deeply grateful to Constitutional Commentary for publishing this symposium on my recent book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against Originalisms. In the book, I put forward a sustained critique of originalism-whether old or new, concrete or abstract, living or dead. Instead, I defend what Ronald Dworkin called a "moral reading" of the U.S. Constitution' and what Sotirios A. Barber and I have called a "philosophic approach" to constitutional interpretation.4 By "moral reading" and "philosophic approach," I refer to conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political principles-not codifying concrete historical rules or …

Reading Deboer And Obergefell Through The "Moral Readings Versus Originalisms" Debate: From Constitutional "Empty Cupboards" To Evolving Understandings, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

This article assesses the debate over “moral reading” and “originalist” approaches to constitutional interpretation by evaluating the momentous constitutional controversy in the United States over access by same-sex couples to civil marriage. Justice Kennedy’s landmark opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), which held that such couples have a fundamental right to marry, employed a “moral reading” in emphasizing dual forms of evolving understanding: of constitutional guarantees of equality and the “promise of liberty” and of the institution of marriage. By contrast to the dissenters, the majority rejected a static, narrow reading of the fundamental right to marry – and marriage …

Reflections Of An Empirical Reader (Or: Could Fleming Be Right This Time?), Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Jim Fleming’s new book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against Originalisms, purports to critique all forms of originalism from the perspective of Professor Fleming’s “moral reading” of, or “philosophic approach” to, the Constitution. I propose a somewhat different opposition: empirical reading versus moral reading. Empirical reading is necessarily originalist, but it focuses directly on the need to ground interpretation in theories of concepts, language, and communication. In this short comment, I outline the research agenda for a theory of empirical reading, explore the extent to which empirical readings and moral readings of the Constitution are …

The Moral Reading As A Practice: A Response To Three Comments On Fidelity To Our Imperfect Constitution, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, many originalists have claimed a monopoly on concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretation. In my book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 1 I reject originalisms—whether old or new, concrete or abstract, living or dead. Instead, I defend what Ronald Dworkin called a “moral reading” of the United States Constitution, or a “philosophic approach” to constitutional interpretation. I refer to conceptions of the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political principles—not codifying concrete historical rules or practices—and of interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments about how they are best understood—not merely historical research to discover relatively …

The Moral Reading All Down The Line, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Michael W. McConnell has written an elegant and illuminating article about constitutional interpretation.' He seeks to show how five major methodological approaches fit together. The five approaches he discusses are: "originalism, precedent, longstanding practice, judicial restraint, and living constitutionalism (here called the normative approach)."'2 He distinguishes two camps with respect to these approaches. One camp, he notes, "advocates for (or against) a particular approach ... on the assumption that these approaches are mutually inconsistent and that the task is to determine which is best . . . .3 The other camp "treats the various common approaches as mere tools in …

Fidelity, Change, And The Good Constitution, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In thinking about fidelity and change in constitutional interpretation, many have framed the basic choice as being between originalism and living constitutionalism. Consider, for example, Jack M. Balkin’s Living Originalism, Robert W. Bennett and Lawrence B. Solum’s Constitutional Originalism: A Debate, and John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport’s Originalism and the Good Constitution. I shall argue for the superiority of what Ronald Dworkin called “moral readings of the Constitution” and what what Sotirios A. Barber and I have called a “philosophic approach” to constitutional interpretation. By “moral reading” and “philosophic approach,” I refer to conceptions of the Constitution as …

Language Disenfranchisement In Juries: A Call For Constitutional Remediation, Jasmine Gonzales Rose

Faculty Scholarship

Approximately thirteen million U.S. citizens, mostly Latinos and other people of color, are denied the right to serve on juries due to English language requirements and despite the possibility (and centuries-old tradition) of juror language accommodation. This exclusion results in the underrepresentation of racial minorities on juries and has a detrimental impact on criminal defendants, the perceived legitimacy of the justice system, and citizen participation in democracy. Yet, it has been virtually ignored. This Article examines the constitutionality of juror language requirements, focusing primarily on equal protection and the fair cross section requirement of the Sixth Amendment. Finding the existing …

The Inclusiveness Of The New Originalism, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In tracing the arc of originalism from the old originalism to the new, I observe a shift from an exclusionary outlook to an inclusionary outlook, reflected in new originalists’ proclamations that “we are all originalists now.” As my title suggests, I am going to bring out the inclusiveness of the new originalism and ponder its implications. The new originalists have emphasized two developments: (1) the movement from a focus on “intention of the framers” to “original public meaning” and (2) the articulation of and emphasis on the distinction between interpretation and construction. My main points are two. First, the inclusiveness …

Fit, Justification, And Fidelity In Constitutional Interpretation, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

With this event – a Symposium on Abner Greene’s Against Obligation2 and Michael Seidman’s On Constitutional Disobedience3 – we continue our Boston University Law Review series of symposia on significant recent books in law. The distinctive format is to pick two books that join issue on an important topic, to invite the author of each book to write an essay on the other book, and to invite several Boston University School of Law faculty members to write an essay on one or both books.

Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, some have asked: “Are we all originalists now?” My response is: “I hope not!” In the Article, I explain why. But first, I show that there is a trick in the question: Even to pose the question “Are we all originalists now?” suggests that one is presupposing what I shall call “the originalist premise.” To answer the question affirmatively certainly shows that one is presupposing it. The originalist premise is the assumption that originalism, rightly conceived, is the best, or indeed the only, conception of fidelity in constitutional interpretation. Put more strongly, it is the assumption that …

The New Originalist Manifesto, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Lawrence B. Solum and Robert W. Bennett's excellent book, Constitutional Originalism: A Debate, calls to mind a famous book in political philosophy, J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams's Utilitarianism: For and Against.' Both works pair two spirited yet fair-minded scholars in a constructive debate between two competing views prevalent in their fields. Originalism has a reasonable, programmatic, and inclusive proponent in Solum, and living constitutionalism has a capable, pragmatic, and effective champion in Bennett.

Dead Document Walking, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

As this symposium commences, originalism is a hot topic to discuss and a cool position to advocate. Either portion of that statement would have been nearly inconceivable two decades ago when I started in academia. Originalism at that time was something of an intellectual backwater, with a very limited set of adherents and an even more limited set of critics who were willing to take originalist ideas seriously.1

Living Originalism And Living Constitutionalism As Moral Readings Of The American Constitution, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

With this event – A Symposium on Jack Balkin’s Living Originalism and David Strauss’s The Living Constitution – we launch a Boston University School of Law series of symposia on significant recent books in law. The distinctive format is to pick two significant books that join issue on an important topic, to invite the author of each book to write an essay on the other book, and to invite several Boston University School of Law faculty to write an essay on one or both books.

What are the justifications for pairing Balkin’s Living Originalism1 and Strauss’s The Living Constitution2 in …

Why The 'Originalism' In 'Living Originalism'?, Hugh Baxter

Faculty Scholarship

Jack Balkin’s "Living Originalism" (2011), together with the companion volume "Constitutional Redemption," is an extraordinary achievement that secures his position in the front rank of American constitutional theorists. In those works, Balkin develops a constitutional theory he identifies alternatively as “living originalism” and as “framework originalism.” In this latter expression, Balkin distinguishes two senses of the term “framework.” In the first sense of “framework,” the Constitution establishes a framework for governance and politics. The second sense of “framework” derives from the first. Governance, Balkin argues, involves state-building and constitutional construction by the political branches, not just by the courts. Social …

No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism And The Limits Of Legal Theory, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Martin H. Redish is on the warpath. Like General Sherman marching toward Atlanta (or Justin Tuck marching toward Tom Brady), Professor Redish, together with Matthew Arnould,1 lays waste to every constitutional theory that he encounters. Originalism, with its “belief that constitutional interpretation should be characterized exclusively by an effort to determine the Constitution’s meaning by means of some form of historical inquiry,”2 generates “an often contrived and opaque veil of historical inquiry”3 that provides “an ideal smokescreen behind which judges may pursue their personal[,] moral, political[,] or economic goals with relative impunity.”4 Nontextual theories, for their part, “permit[] selective …